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Abstract 
There exist undiscussed parallels between futures studies and finance, in both theory and prac-
tice. The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate how Gordon’s (2009a) Trend Impact Anal-
ysis could be combined with a dividend discount model (DDM) in order to value the publicly 
traded stock of a Case Company (Olvi Oyj), explicitly taking into account the estimated impacts 
and probabilities of a few uncertain future phenomena. DDMs are understood as a simple ver-
sion of discounted cash flow (DCF) methods, and TIA could be possibly applicable with more 
advanced DCFs as well. There exist no published applications of TIA with DCFs. Among the 
scenario methods used in finance with DCFs, simulation approaches have the highest similarity 
to TIA. 
Primary data was collected with two online surveys. Anonymous retail investors interested 
in the Case Company were used as experts. They provided a source of potentially significant 
future phenomena, and defined subjective judgments of related probabilities and impacts on 
net profit. Experts focused almost exclusively on phenomena related to the end products of the 
Case Company, instead of “less visible” aspects of the business. Replicating Gordon’s (2009a) 
TIA process, aggregated expert judgments were combined with an extrapolated base scenario, 
and a Monte Carlo simulation of 10,000 probabilistic modified trends (PMT) scenarios of net 
profit was performed. The simulation revealed that the expected combined effect of the few 
studied phenomena would be relatively unimportant. Dividends were assumed based on the 
dividend policy of the Case Company, and a DDM was used to value main PMT scenarios. The 
DDM suggests that the stock is most likely overvalued. However, the stock price could be 
considered fair if one specific analyzed future phenomenon occurs soon. Several reasons sug-
gest that all the overall result may be too conservative. Further research is required to conclude 
if TIA is applicable in the analysis of free cash flows in DCF models. 
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Tiivistelmä 
Tulevaisuudentutkimuksen ja rahoituksen välillä on aiemmin käsittelemättömiä yhtäläisyyksiä 
sekä teoriassa ja käytännössä. Tämän pro gradu -työn tarkoitus on näyttää kuinka Gordonin 
(2009a) trendien vaikutus-analyysi (TIA) voidaan yhdistää osinko-diskonttausmallin kanssa 
Case-yrityksen (Olvi Oyj) julkisesti vaihdetun osakkeen arvon määritykseen, ottaen 
eksplisiittisesti huomioon muutamien epävarmojen tulevaisuuden ilmiöiden vaikutukset ja 
todennäköisyydet. Osinko-diskonttausmallit voidaan ymmärtää yksinkertaisena versiona 
kassavirran diskonttausmalleista (DCF), joten TIA voisi mahdollisesti olla sovellettavissa 
myös kehittyneempien DCF-mallien kanssa. Ei ole julkaisuja, joissa TIAa olisi käytetty DCF-
mallien kanssa. Niistä skenaariometodeista, joita käytetään rahoituksessa kassavirran 
diskonttausmallien kanssa, simulaatiotyökalut ovat lähimpänä TIAa. 
Perustietoa kerättiin kahden internet-kyselytutkimuksen kautta. Nimettömiä 
yksityissijoittajia, jotka ovat kiinnostuneita Case-yrityksestä, käytettiin asiantuntijoina. He 
toimivat lähteenä mahdollisesti merkittäville tulevaisuuden ilmiöille, ja määrittivät 
subjektiiviset arvionsa ilmiöiden todennäköisyyksistä ja vaikutuksista nettovoittoon. 
Asiantuntijat keskittyivät lähes ainoastaan sellaisiin ilmiöihin, jotka koskevat Case-yrityksen 
lopputuotteita, liiketoiminnan “vähemmän näkyvien” osien sijasta. Gordonin (2009a) TIA-
metodia replikoitiin yhdistämällä koostetut asiantuntijoiden arviot ekstrapoloidun 
perusskenaarion kanssa, ja Monte Carlo -simulaatiolla tehtiin 10,000 probabilistic modified 
trends (PMT) skenaariota nettovoitosta. Simulaatio paljasti, että tutkittujen ilmiöiden odotettu 
yhteinen vaikutus ei todennäköisesti olisi kovin merkittävä. Osingot oletettiin perustuen 
yrityksen osinkopolitiikkaan, ja osinko-diskonttausmallia käytettiin arvostamaan keskeisimmät 
PMT-skenaariot. Osinko-diskonttausmallin tulos viittaa siihen, että osake on oletettavasti 
yliarvostettu. Osakkeen hintaa voitaisiin pitää kuitenkin kohtuullisena, jos yksi tietty tutkituista 
tulevaisuuden ilmiöistä tapahtuisi pian. Muutamat seikat viittavat sihen, että lopputulos voi olla 
liian konservatiivinen. Jatkotutkimusta tarvitaan, jotta voidaan ymmärtää, onko TIA soveltuva 
vapaiden kassavirtojen analysointiin DCF-malleissa. 
Avainsanat trendien vaikutus-analyysi, osinkojen diskonttaus, kassavirran diskonttaus, 
probabilistic modified trends, osakkeen arvon määrittäminen 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
There are undiscussed commonalities and links between the academic fields of futures 
studies and finance. Like futures studies, the act of investing for profit (in a broad sense) 
is inherently concerned with trying to make sense of the range of possible futures. Yet 
despite the obvious connection, it is remarkable how little has been published specifically 
about potential applications of futures studies theories, concepts and methods to finance 
and investing. Such parallels are not only philosophical but might also extend to method-
ology. This observation is the initial motivation for this thesis. 
A central future-oriented problem in finance is that of valuation. A method called 
discounted cash flow (DCF) is based on the idea that a cash-generating asset, such as a 
stock or a bond, is intrinsically worth the sum of all the cash flows it will ever produce, 
discounted back to the present by applying an appropriate discount rate (Damodaran 
2006, 117). It is recognized in DCFs that there is an inherent uncertainty in the estimation 
of those future cash flows, and the use of various scenario methods is not new in DCFs. 
The main objective in this thesis is to demonstrate how scenarios created with Gordon’s 
(2009a) explorative futures studies method trend impact analysis (TIA) might be appli-
cable in combination with a simple dividend discount model (DDM) in order to value a 
stock, depending on how a specified list of uncertain future events may take place. TIA 
produces quantitative scenarios in the probabilistic modified trends (PMT) school of sce-
narios (Bradfield et al. 2005, 800), which could be inputs in valuation methods. TIA offers 
a structured way to explicitly state assumptions about the future, which might be benefi-
cial for thinking and decision-making in valuation. 
While this thesis will only demonstrate a simple application with a DDM, it can be 
considered to be in the DCF family of methods (Damodaran 2006, 14). The larger argu-
ment is that TIA might possibly be applicable to other variants of DCFs, not only to a 
DDM. The publicly traded share of a Finnish company called Olvi Oyj is used as the 
subject (“Case Company”) in this thesis. It must be underlined that none of the companies 
or persons named in this thesis have participated in its creation in any way, and no col-
laboration with them is implied. 
The research approach is critical realism, where it is supposed that generative mech-
anisms are the deepest level of an objective reality, which is not observable directly, but 
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it could be possibly understood through the study of events and experiences (Fisher 2010, 
261). In critical realism, systematic knowledge of the world can be obtainable, but it is 
inevitably influenced by subjectivity (ibid, 17). Mixed methods are used in the thesis; 
while the TIA and DDM methods result in quantitative outputs, most of their inputs are 
also based on qualitative and subjective judgments of the world. 
1.2 Research questions 
There is a total of four research questions posed in this thesis. The questions are listed in 
the same order that they are answered. 
Research question 1: “In futures studies literature, has trend impact analysis ever 
been used in any applications with discounted cash flow methods or similar valuation 
methods?” The question is straightforward and is answered with a literature review. If 
any documented cases do exist, they would provide important material. 
Research question 2: “In finance literature, what are the main scenario methods that 
are used in combination with discounted cash flow analyses, and how are those methods 
different from trend impact analysis?” This is also answered through the literature review. 
Different types of scenario methods in DCFs can be listed and compared against each 
other, as well with the TIA method. 
Research question 3: “What kinds of possible future phenomena does a small group 
of Finnish retail investors consider most impactful for Olvi Oyj’s net profit towards 
2030?” The subjective opinions of a small group of retail investors are used as a primary 
data source in the application of TIA, and the answer to research question 3 comes from 
categories of phenomena given by these persons. The question is specifically narrowed 
to “a small group”, as there is no claim that conclusions about all Finnish retail investors 
could be made. 
Research question 4: “What range of valuation is found for Olvi Oyj through a trend 
impact analysis combined with a dividend discount model?” The question is answered by 
creating PMT scenarios with a TIA and valuing resulting main scenarios with a DDM. 
1.3 Thesis structure 
This thesis builds gradually from theory through a literature review to the practical appli-
cation of the TIA & DDM methods. The structure is visualized in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Structure of the thesis. 
 
The second section discusses the main theoretical ideas that shape this thesis. Those the-
ories are again referred to throughout the work, where relevant. The third section is an 
examination of the TIA & DCF methods through a systematic literature review. The 
fourth section discusses what exactly is studied and how it is to be done. This includes 
rationale for why specific data collection choices are made, specific details on how TIA 
& DDM methods are applied, and what kinds of adjustments are made so that they can 
fit each other. The fifth section shows the results of the TIA and DDM processes, step-
by-step, arriving at a range of valuation for the publicly traded share of the Case Com-
pany. The sixth section summarizes the answers to the research questions and outlines 
main limitations. It also gives suggestions for what parties might be potential users of 
TIA with DCFs, and for specific further areas of research. Appendices in the end consist 
of details related to the collection and processing of primary and secondary data. 
1.4 Semantic clarifications 
There are three semantic clarifications that should be made to avoid any confusion. One 
of the main authors associated with the development of DDMs is economist Myron Gor-
don, and the DDM is often called the “Gordon growth model” (Pratt & Grabowski 2014, 
40). However, any references attributed to “Gordon” in this document only refer to the 
futurist Theodore Gordon. 
12 
 
The meanings of the word “scenario” and related methods are inconsistent across 
academic literature. The primary intended meaning of a “scenario” in this thesis is a PMT 
scenario, which are the output created by TIA. In finance, the word “scenario” is not 
necessarily understood and used with the same meaning(s) as in futures studies. Also 
within futures studies, there exist multiple meanings and debate over how “scenarios” are 
defined (Börjeson et al. 2006, 724). 
The word “futures” in this document never refers to the types of derivative financial 
instruments of that name. Instead, the word is mainly used with the meaning of “possible 
futures”, as widely understood in futures studies. This refers to the broad notion that there 
are alternative possible futures that may or may not become real, see Bell (1997, 75-80) 
among others. There are also references to the academic journal titled “Futures”. 
13 
 
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Overview 
This section is about the main theoretical assumptions that inform this thesis. First, the 
concept of intrinsic value in finance is explained. Second, through the futures cone frame-
work, it is shown that a vast range of possible alternative futures is not studied at all in 
common DCF models. Third, PMT scenarios are suggested as a way to illustrate alterna-
tive futures in DCFs. Fourth, it is discussed how traditional value investing philosophy 
has a notably cautious approach towards the futures and forecasting, which might be a 
counterargument to the use of futures studies in investing, and acts here as a sort of an 
antithesis against the active study of futures. 
2.2 Intrinsic value 
Williams (1938) is credited with differentiating that an asset like a stock or a bond has an 
“intrinsic value”. This is explicitly a different figure from whatever price the same asset 
has on capital markets. This separation between intrinsic value and market price has been 
called the “foundation of modern finance” (Carlisle 2014, 44). In the same work, Wil-
liams (1938) also defined formulae like the DDM to calculate intrinsic value through the 
income that will be received in the future from an investment. This might be considered 
the formal beginning of the DCF group of methods, although one interpretation of the 
1202 book “Liber Abaci” by Fibonacci is that it includes the earliest documented DCF 
calculation (Goetzmann 2004, 29).  
For those investors who are mainly concerned with the fundamentals of assets (rather 
than with only the trading of them) it should logically be a priority to find out the intrinsic 
value of an asset, before looking at what its current market price is. The problem is that 
intrinsic value remains an epistemologically distant concept, because it cannot ever be 
determined for certain; instead, it merely can be approximated using various valuation 
methods. An accurate calculation of intrinsic value would require perfect knowledge of 
all information, that of a “Laplace’s demon” (Mauboussin 2007, 223). Valuation is a 
“complex ill-structured task”, meaning that there is no obvious best way to solve the 
problem, and the quality of the process cannot be perfectly compared against a standard 
benchmark, due to the uniqueness of each situation (Olsen 2002, 162). This means that it 
is impossible to fully understand how far a valuation analysis is from the true intrinsic 
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value, which also makes it problematic to distinguish analyst skill from luck (Damodaran 
2007, 10).  
2.3 Futures cone 
The futures cone by Voros (2003, 16) is a generic framework for gaining perspective to 
the range of alternative futures, applicable to any subject. The cone, and the different 
kinds of futures in it, are a major paradigm in futures studies overall. Perhaps the earliest 
version of the cone may have been created by Taylor (1990); Voros (2003, 16) also gives 
credit to Hancock & Bezold (1994). 
The futures cone is a visualization of existing categorizations of the alternative fu-
tures, including by Amara (1991, 647-649) and Henchey (1978). Even though time is 
linear and not all possible alternative futures will be realized (Bell 1997, 140-142), the 
future (singular) is assumed to be open and not predetermined, which is why it is justifi-
able to study alternative futures (ibid, 150-154). Henchey (1978, 26) summarizes the four 
kinds of futures as “possible futures (what may be); preferable futures (what should be); 
plausible futures (what could be); and probable futures (what will likely be)”. The value 
of these four futures is especially in understanding their interrelationships (ibid).  
“Possible futures” is the broadest category and the easiest to define objectively. It is 
a set of futures encompassing everything that may happen, including all other kinds of 
futures. A possible future simply has a greater probability than zero of being realized. 
There are still impossible futures that clearly cannot become true (e.g. due to the laws of 
physics being a limiting factor) but researchers in the futures studies field prefer to avoid 
rejecting new ideas about the future just because they sound impossible in a conventional 
sense (Bell 1997, 79). 
“Plausible futures” are considered a subset of possible futures in the futures cone 
(Voros 2003, 16-17), though some authors like Amara (1991) do not make the explicit 
distinction. Plausible futures could be imagined as real and achievable, based on current 
knowledge of the world that already exists. Plausible futures can act as a bridge of sorts 
to envisioning how preferable futures could be reached (Henchey 1978, 27).  
“Preferable futures” are, by contrast, highly subjective and implicitly normative: hu-
man actors define what their preferable future for a given issue is. This is directly con-
nected to ethical principles that are used to justify the reasons why one future would be 
more preferable than another (ibid, 87). Since this thesis has to do with investing on a 
general level, it may be worth discussing in more detail what preferable can mean for 
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investors. It could be those futures where specific investment objectives are achieved over 
a given time horizon. Objectives related to profit may be defined in terms of total return, 
by either matching or outperforming a benchmark (e.g. a market index). However, they 
can include something else – here, the subjectivity in “preferable” is demonstrated in the 
real world. For example, it may be considered better to achieve equal returns to a bench-
mark but with lower measures of portfolio volatility. The use of such statistical measures 
in portfolio evaluation was originally started by Markowitz (1952), in the context of mod-
ern portfolio theory (Hitchner 2017, 193). Another example of a different objective is the 
growing popularity of ESG investing (“Environmental, Social and Corporate Govern-
ance”): for some, a “preferable” future also means satisfying ethical objectives, alongside 
with return (MSCI Inc., 2020). In other words, some investors are not only concerned 
with the size of returns but also with where those returns originate from. 
The fourth major type of futures, “probable futures”, are “what the most likely fu-
ture[s] of some specified phenomenon would be within some stated time period and under 
specified contingencies” (Bell 1997, 80). Amara (1991, 647) states probable futures are 
about mapping out the “structure of possible paths” and the relationships of futures phe-
nomena “to understand the situation as a whole”. Within the area of probable futures, 
Voros (2015) has further defined the “projected” future as “the default, business as usual, 
extrapolated ‘continuation of the past through the present’ ‘baseline’ future”. The pro-
jected future is also synonymous with some, but not all, common definitions of the word 
“prediction”, when it is taken as an expression of an expected outcome (Bell 1997, 97-
99). 
A caveat with thinking about the future through the futures cone is that it can only 
ever be mapped out partially: “the future will never be completely known or even know-
able” (Gordon 1992, 26). Futures that are possible, yet unknowable and unimaginable, 
are located outside the scope of the futures cone and have been termed “potential” futures 
by Voros (2003, 16). Despite this limit to knowledge, it is a basic stance in futures studies 
that it is still worthwhile to attempt to systematically explore the possible futures (Gordon 
1992, 26), instead of giving up in the face of the unknown. Based on the futures cone by 
Voros (2003, 16), Figure 2 illustrates the main theoretical framework of this thesis. 
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Figure 2. A DCF in the futures cone. Adapted from Voros (2003, 16). 
 
It is proposed in this theoretical framework that most DCF analyses generally intend to 
reflect the projected future, which lies at the center of the probable futures. If a DCF 
fulfills its purpose and is performed with analytical rigor, it should be a calculation of 
intrinsic value, where various possible outcomes are assessed relevant weights according 
to their probability, to arrive at a probability-weighted “expected value”. 
In practice, the locations and sizes of the different areas representing alternative fu-
tures are not always necessarily as visualized in Figure 2. A DCF could also sometimes 
be an explicitly stated expression of preferable futures, instead of the probable futures. 
This could be the case when using DCFs as a demonstration of what would need to happen 
for a valuation outcome to be realized. Perhaps in an ideal situation for investors, it can 
be possible for the area between the preferable futures, probable futures and the projected 
future to be overlapping. However, criticality in assessing what a DCF truly reflects is 
required. For example, model assumptions may be based more on hopes than facts, which 
might steer a projection only toward the preferable futures, but not the probable futures – 
something that could become apparent only after a critical re-examination of the model. 
Also, a DCF could fall outside the entire futures cone, following impossible assumptions 
and/or analytical error. To summarize the argument, the true position of a DCF in the 
futures cone is not necessarily readily apparent, although the intention of DCFs might be 
a projected future, in the center of probable futures.  
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2.4 Probabilistic modified trends (PMT) scenarios 
Probabilistic modified trends (PMT) scenarios are specifically the only types of scenarios 
produced in this thesis. Bishop et al. (2007, 8) found that in futures studies, the word 
“scenario” has dozens of definitions and there is no exact fixed meaning. Glenn (2009, 2) 
puts this more bluntly, writing that the word “is probably the most abused term in futures 
research”. In contrast with the relatively accepted concept of alternative futures, there is 
less universal agreement on what scenarios are (Börjeson et al. 2006, 724). Alternative 
futures and scenarios may have some overlap, but are not the same (Bishop et al. 2007, 
6). A single scenario contains a description of some chain(s) of events leading to some 
future state (ibid) (Amer et al. 2013, 23). Scenarios are made with different mixes of 
underlying assumptions, and using combinations of one or more methods; these are main 
reasons for why definitions are so varying (Bishop et al. 2007, 7). 
In this thesis, scenarios are not necessarily understood as either a theory or a method, 
but as a way of presenting research outputs, and Bell (1997, 316) offers a description for 
this understanding of scenarios as “a way of summarizing the results of futures research”. 
In this view, scenarios are a way to describe the plurality of futures. By comparing dif-
ferent scenarios with each other, meaningful narratives about the range of possible futures 
could be told (ibid). According to Meadows (2009, 47), the decision-making value of 
scenario studies of dynamic systems is not in predicting the future with pinpoint accuracy, 
but in exploring “what would happen, if a number of driving factors unfold in a range of 
different ways”. Specifically, when scenario thinking might be applied to DCFs, this “dy-
namic system” would be the business being studied.  
The school of PMT scenarios was created by futurists Theodore Gordon and Olaf 
Helmer. This origin is directly linked with the development of the associated methods 
trend impact analysis (TIA) and cross impact analysis (CIA) (Bishop et al. 2007, 9). These 
are the main – or even the only – methods that produce PMT scenarios (Bradfield et al. 
2005, 800). It should be noted that Gordon (2009a; 2009b) does not actually refer to PMT 
scenarios, and the grouping of TIA and CIA into that category was originally done by 
Bradfield et al. (2005, 805). In their classification, PMT scenarios are one of three major 
schools of scenarios in futures studies; the other two are “intuitive logics” and “La pro-
spective” (ibid). The classification to three schools has gained some level of recognition 
(Amer et al. 2013, 26-30) and is an useful way to understand how PMT scenarios are 
different from most scenarios. 
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The distinctive feature of PMT scenarios is that they are expressed in quantitative 
and probabilistic statements which are narrow in scope, focusing on specified lists of var-
iables that could affect a specific trend (Bradfield et al. 2005, 806). For example, the only 
practical distinguishing feature between two PMT scenarios may be a difference in a sin-
gle value in a database. In contrast, qualitative scenarios, like those in the intuitive logics 
category, exclude assumptions about probability, and instead include custom-written dis-
cursive narratives detailing fictional storylines for each scenario (ibid, 808). Glenn (2009, 
2-3) insists that narration about causes and effects is integral to scenarios, and purely 
quantitative models of the future should be called “projections”. However, Bradfield et 
al. (2005, 801) point out how PMT scenarios are still justifiably called scenarios, and not 
something else like projections, for the key reason that the methods of their creation, like 
TIA and CIA, do involve human narratives and judgments about the future. 
Users of intuitive logics scenarios have traditionally expressed strong opposition to 
combining probabilities with scenarios (Millett 2009, 63). This opposition includes that 
probabilities cannot be assigned with certainty, that they can be misleading by implying 
“too much precision”, and the lack of imagination involved in their creation (ibid). A 
major counterargument that defends PMT scenarios is that in most contexts, decision-
makers will be thinking about the likelihoods of scenarios, so scenarios should include a 
structured way to express those odds explicitly (Millett 2009, 65; Gordon 2009a, 7). 
Ramirez & Selin (2014, 61) explain that for many futurists, the epistemological differ-
ences between qualitative and quantitative scenarios (or the “plausible” and “probable” 
futures) are too much to reconcile. However, the exception seems to be the third school, 
La prospective, which can include both storytelling as well as probabilities (Amer et al. 
2013, 28). Bridging such philosophical gaps is out of the scope of this thesis, but it is 
recognized that some futurists do not necessarily consider PMT scenarios or quantitative 
scenarios to be as valid as those in the more qualitative schools. 
PMT scenarios could be concerned with both uncertainty and risk. “Knightian uncer-
tainty” applies to possible future events that are unprecedented, contrary to “risk”, which 
is something measurable based on existing statistics (Ben-Haim & Demertzis 2015, 2). 
Numbers assigned to measure Knightian uncertainty may come from subjective probabil-
ity estimates, which are different from objective or frequency probabilities that are based 
on statistical observations of the past. A good definition for subjective probabilities from 
Barnes (2016, 329) is: “[they] relate to single events (rather than repetitions of the same 
action, such as a coin toss) and are an expression of personal belief in the accuracy of a 
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statement or the likelihood of an outcome”. The subjective probabilities of any individual 
combine known frequency probabilities with more qualitative estimations that can be 
drawn from past experiences of oneself and others (Bell 1997, 153). An important prop-
erty of subjective probabilities is that they can be freely altered over time, as known in-
formation changes (ibid). Tetlock & Gardner (2015, 100) claim that such conscious fre-
quent updating of subjective probability judgments improves their reliability. 
No analysis of coherency or consistency is necessarily done for PMT scenarios, but 
they must be verifiable in retrospect (Bradfield et al. 205, 810). If PMT scenarios are used 
consistently for a long period on similar subjects, analysts could build a forecasting “track 
record” and observe how valid their estimates of future probabilities really were – this is 
widely considered a key strength of quantified scenarios (Hirsch et al. 2013, 366; Millett 
2009, 65; Gordon 2009a, 7).  
2.5 Value investing & margin of safety 
There appear to be two main ways to define what “value investing” is. One definition is 
buying assets that have some objectively measurable financial characteristic that can be 
compared against its market price; this can be called the “value factor” (MSCI Inc., 2018). 
Factor definitions of value often mean stocks with a low price divided by their book value 
(value of equity on the balance sheet), called the price-to-book ratio, or its inverse, the 
book-to-market ratio, a measure popularized after research by Fama & French (1993). 
By contrast, the second definition for “value investing” refers to a more loosely ar-
ticulated philosophy or framework of purchasing assets at a discount to their estimated 
intrinsic value (Klarman 1991, xiii). Instead of constructing portfolios based on readily 
observable ratios and formulae that capture historical data (ibid, 17), this view of value 
investing means studying individual assets on a fundamental level (ibid, xiv). It is this 
definition that will be used in this thesis. This type of value investing can be a form of 
“systems thinking”, because the underlying assets themselves are the primary focus of 
study, instead of their prices on financial markets; analyzing price changes is after-the-
fact narrative that does not give insight into the asset itself (Meadows 2009, 89).  
A cornerstone of the value investing philosophy is called “margin of safety”, coined 
by Graham & Dodd (1951, 17)1. Their thesis is that the future is epistemically not fore-
castable, and therefore it is irresponsible to invest based on assumptions of future growth, 
 
1  Originally in 1934, in the first edition of “Security Analysis” (Carlisle 2014, 21). 
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without ensuring that capital can be recovered. “Margin” refers to buying investments 
below what their intrinsic value is, so that there is less downside in unpreferable futures. 
The margin of safety idea also means that lower risk could sometimes lead to higher re-
turns, which is notably the polar opposite of “orthodox” finance theory, where risk and 
return follow a directional relationship (Carlisle 2014, 21). Finding opportunities with a 
margin of safety would be possible by being a contrarian and investing in unpopular as-
sets. The most obvious investment ideas are not necessarily a good place to begin: “if the 
future of an industry is definitely rosy, stock prices will almost always reflect this element 
quite fully” (Graham & Dodd 1951, 69). When buying undervalued assets, a long-term 
orientation is required for success, because it can take an unknowable period of time for 
asset prices to align with their intrinsic value. 
Graham & Dodd (1951, 71-72) also recognized that all financial forecasts (including 
DCFs) are highly subjective and qualitative: 
 
“Financial theory […] has sometimes sought to estimate future earnings by projecting the 
past trend into the future, and it has then used this projection as a basis for valuing the 
business. Because figures are used in this process, people mistakenly believe that it is 
“mathematically sound”. But while a trend shown in the past is a fact, a “future trend” is 
only an assumption.” (Graham & Dodd 1951, 71) 
 
Their conclusion is to only invest in assets that are “protected against change”, and that 
possess “inherently stable character than one subject to wide variations” (ibid). Effec-
tively, investments where capital is protected in as many futures as possible. After Gra-
ham & Dodd, value practitioners such as Klarman (1991) or Pabrai (2007) follow the 
margin of safety idea by defining similar conservative asset choice rules, such as buying 
“simple businesses in industries with an ultra-slow rate of change” (Pabrai 2007, 35), and 
putting little to no value on research and development (ibid, 46) or intangible assets (Klar-
man 1991, 93-94). The assumption is that simpler businesses in secular (as opposed to 
cyclical) industries are more easily forecastable than complex businesses that operate in 
rapidly changing environments. There also exists some empirical evidence for simplicity 
and stability improving actual predictability. For instance, a study by Dichev & Wei Tang 
(2009) shows that based on the historical trend of earnings, analysts are most accurately 
able to predict future earnings for companies whose earnings were the least volatile (most 
stable) in the past, up to five years to the future. 
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Despite strong dismissals of making claims about the future, even traditional value 
investors must still perform at least one active exercise in foresight, because they have to 
somehow try to identify businesses that are resistant to change. This is a difficult process 
and highly qualitative, and one area where investing might lean towards being art, not 
science, which is how futures studies is commonly characterized (Bell 1997, 167-168). 
One fast way to qualitatively identify businesses that are resistant to change could be to 
utilize the Taleb’s (2012, 316-318) Lindy effect heuristic, where the probable lifespan of 
a non-perishable concept increases with every moment that it continues to exist; a longer 
historical life of such a system means that it is likely to live longer than new innovations. 
In businesses, things that might have this Lindy characteristic could be identifiable as 
business models, brands, production processes or other intangible assets or parts of a 
company, as long as their recorded lifespan is extraordinarily long.  
Therefore, traditional value investors emphasize historical and present-day 
knowledge, and avoid actively forecasting the future; it may appear that is directly op-
posed to what is being done in this thesis. However, that is not necessarily the case – a 
value framework could support the objective. If there exists a business characteristic of 
“predictability” (as a consequence of the simple, stable and slow-to-change nature of a 
business), then extrapolative methods should be less difficult to apply on those types of 
businesses. In other words, if one is going to attempt any kind of financial forecasting 
exercise, then it is better to try that with a subject that is easier to forecast. DCFs (and by 
extension, DDMs) are the most suitable financial tool when analyzing stable business 
landscapes, where there is “structural predictability […] at the expense of limited oppor-
tunities for growth and new businesses” (Mauboussin 2007, 156-157). Therefore, the 
business that will be studied in this thesis should possess value characteristics of simplic-
ity, stability and a slow rate of change. 
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3 TIA & DCF METHODS 
3.1 Overview 
This section is based on a systematic literature review of TIAs and DCFs. Through this 
examination, some possible common ground between the academic disciplines of finance 
and futures studies is partially exposed. The purpose of this section is to find answers to 
research questions 1 and 2. 
In the literature review, a limited set of the most prominent journals in accounting 
and finance and futures studies is explored, and some databases are searched using a 
standardized set of keywords. Only a fraction of all existing material can be covered, 
which is an unavoidable limitation. The search is also limited to the English language. To 
identify influential accounting and finance journals, the Scimago website is used as a 
starting point. The website ranks journals according to their academic influence (Scimago 
2020). Twelve journals are identified in the “Finance” subcategory. Due to futures studies 
being a relatively small field, there is no category for it on Scimago, but a list of prominent 
journals is made based on the thesis author’s professional knowledge. Six such journals 
are identified. Appendix 1 lists the journals used. 
Based on a choice of topical keywords, applied to all parts of the search results (in-
cluding article titles, abstracts, the main body of text and others), a manual examination 
through the search results is performed. The keyword combinations used in this activity 
are in Appendix 1. Only articles that have a seemingly directly relevant title and/or ab-
stract are studied further. This involves a degree of qualitative judgment by the author of 
this thesis and may be significantly influenced by his perception. The same keywords are 
also searched using Google, a conventional web search engine. Also, some relevant books 
are used. Especially for the DCF method, a popular textbook about investment valuation 
by Damodaran (2006) is a critical resource throughout this thesis. 
To summarize overall findings, the studied finance journals do not appear to contain 
anything directly referring TIA, and most futures studies journals rarely contain direct 
references to DCFs. In hindsight, it is possible that the choice of finance journals should 
be more focused specifically on investment finance, and more keywords could be used. 
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3.2 Trend impact analysis (TIA) 
The first version of trend impact analysis was created in the 1970s by Theodore Gordon 
with a consulting firm called The Futures Group (Gordon 2009a, 1). The purpose of the 
method is to analyze how a list of unprecedented future events and trends might influence 
a single extrapolated trend. Most methods of forecasting by extrapolation practically 
leave such surprising future events out of consideration, and TIA was developed as a 
response to that (ibid). The output of a TIA are PMT scenarios. 
TIA is done for a specific time horizon that stays constant throughout the process. 
For consistency of terminology, this is referred to as the “forecast period” hereafter in this 
thesis. Even though the need to have a precise time horizon should be obvious in any kind 
of forecasting activity, in practice many expert forecasts still often do not define them, 
which leads to vagueness, and an impossibility of verifying, testing or improving fore-
casts later (Tetlock & Gardner 2015, 30).  
There is always only one main trend that is analyzed in a TIA. Extrapolating this 
trend to the future time horizon is the first step of the process. This extrapolation is simply 
a projection how the trend would continue if all known factors influencing it stayed the 
same. To determine which type of function to use for extrapolation, several alternatives 
need to be compared against each other. This is done by fitting various types of trendlines/ 
curves functions to the historical time series (Gordon 2009a, 2). Algorithms for finding 
trendlines are available in statistics related software (ibid, 10). Then, it is possible to iden-
tify the one function that best fits the historical time series by comparing a coefficient of 
determination, R2, computed individually for each function, against the historical time 
series of the trend (ibid, 2, 10). The function with the highest R2 is taken as the “best-fit 
function”, and values for future time periods are input to that function, which creates an 
extrapolated time series (ibid, 2). This type of simple trend extrapolation assumes “a con-
tinuation of past change, that is, unchanging change” (Bell 1997, 250). For clarity, this 
resulting extrapolated time series is called a “base scenario” – this is not a general term, 
but one that is merely used in this thesis. 
After extrapolation, the next step in TIA is creating a list of future trends and events 
that could affect the base scenario. In this thesis, these future trends and events are named 
“TIA statements” (again, this is not a general term). The list of sources that is used to 
create the TIA statements can include one or more methods, like horizon scanning, liter-
ature reviews or simply asking experts (Gordon 2009a, 4). There are several criteria to 
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qualify phenomena as TIA statements. Most importantly, the potential impacts of these 
phenomena on the base scenario should be independent, meaning that if two will occur at 
the same time, there would not be an emergent, additional impact created from the com-
bination of the two events. If the events do have some potential combined effects, where 
their simultaneous impact could conceivably create new phenomena and become more or 
less than their sum, other methods like cross impact analysis may be considered instead 
of TIA (Gordon 2009a, 4). 
Three further criteria for the TIA statements are defined by Gordon (2009a, 3-4) as 
“plausible, potentially powerful in impact, and verifiable in retrospect”. “Plausibility” can 
be understood in a futures studies context as “what could happen” and ties back to the 
futures cone framework, in Figure 2. “Potentially powerful in impact”, can be highly sub-
jective, and impact is only analyzed in the next step of a TIA. However, it makes sense 
to exclude phenomena that do not have any conceivable chance of significantly altering 
the base trend. The last criterion, “verifiable”, is here interpreted to mean that the TIA 
statements should be expressed in very concrete terms, rather than vaguely, so that it is 
possible to conclude later if the TIA statement came true or not. It is noted that in half (7 
out of 14) of the examples presented by Gordon (2009a, 11-16), the TIA statement given 
to experts is explicitly quantified. A potential benefit of statements that include numbers 
is that people analyzing them will have a similar understanding of their scale, and will 
work from a similar base of understanding when making their judgments. 
Subjective judgments of the probability and impact of each TIA statement must be 
made for each time period in the future. Both are expressed as percentages. “Probability” 
is an estimate of how likely it is that the TIA statement will come true in a specified time 
period – assuming it did not already happen in previous time periods. “Impact” is an 
estimate of how much a TIA statement would alter the base scenario (negatively or posi-
tively) in each time period, starting from the initial occurrence of that TIA statement. 
Because impact is also expressed as a percentage, and not in absolute values, it is possible 
to apply any impact judgment to any individual point in the projected time series. 
The expert judgments can be defined at various levels of detail; theoretically, the 
most precise way would be to individually consider each time period. Instead of that, to 
manage the workload of estimating, Gordon (2009a, 4) suggests several simple structured 
systems that break down the whole forecast period to a few distinct multi-year periods. 
Then, experts only need to give judgments for those. For impact, the simplest system 
involves just two judgments: first, a definition of the maximum/steady-state level of 
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impact (peak), and second, how much time from the beginning of the event would it take 
until that maximum impact level has been reached (ibid). This allows creating a basic 
“impact curve”, where impact gradually (linearly) advances towards its defined peak over 
the given time period. After this, impact is assumed to stay at the steady-state level for 
every subsequent time period. For simplifying the probability judgment, it might be even 
understood as a simple total probability figure for the forecast period (ibid, 6). 
Expert judgments must be ultimately recorded in an aggregated format. French 
(2011, 183-187) distinguishes between the two main categories of aggregating numeric 
expert judgments. In “behavioral aggregation”, a group of experts interacts in a panel or 
workshop and forms a single consensus response as a group. Gordon’s (2009a) TIA pro-
cess description only includes this kind of aggregation. Behavioral aggregation is also 
done in the Delphi method and other futures studies methods that utilize formats resem-
bling a panel or workshop (Amara 1991, 645). The other main category is “mathematical 
aggregation”, where individual expert responses are combined by simple or complex for-
mulae. Despite the fact that Gordon only discusses behavioral aggregation, a lack of ex-
pert interaction does not necessarily invalidate the TIA method. For example, Hennen & 
Benninga (2009, 18-19) have applied TIA by interviewing their experts individually, and 
aggregated results mathematically. 
The computation of the PMT scenarios involves combining the base scenario with 
the expert judgments. Gordon (2009a, 5) suggests three ways to do this, the most ad-
vanced of these being a Monte Carlo simulation, where individual, independent scenarios 
are calculated a very large number of times. This thesis only focuses on the Monte Carlo 
approach. To outline the computation process of a single PMT scenario in a TIA, based 
on the author’s reading and understanding of Gordon (2009a): 
 
1) Start from the first time period in the forecast period. 
2) Check individually for each TIA statement if it occurred or not, based on aggre-
gate probability judgments. This is done by randomization (effectively by rolling 
a hundred-sided die); if the randomly generated figure is between 0 and the prob-
ability judged for the TIA statement, it is considered as having occurred. If a TIA 
statement occurred, the base scenario value for that time period is multiplied by 
the aggregate impact judgment. These products caused by each TIA statement 
are summed algebraically to obtain a modifier value that is added on the base 
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scenario value in that year. For TIA statements that have not occurred, nothing is 
done (their impact is zero). 
3) After all TIA statements were checked, the next time period is moved onto. It is 
again checked if TIA statements occurred or not, with the important exception 
that those that occurred already in the earlier time period(s) are treated as having 
“begun” in all subsequent periods. For those, the impact figure used is for the nth 
time period after the initial occurrence, where n is time periods after initial oc-
currence. 
4) The process is repeated for each time period until the end of the forecast period 
is reached. The resulting values for each time period consist a single PMT sce-
nario. It is possible that some or all TIA statements did not ever happen in a sce-
nario. It is also common that some of the TIA statements began, but the forecast 
period simply ended before their impacts were fully realized. 
5) The PMT scenario is saved to a database, including the full calculation details of 
each time period. 
 
After independently calculating scenarios a large number of times, the complete output is 
a full range of scenarios. A practical way to summarize the results is to show the directly 
observed range and quartiles, or any other measures of variability, as well as possibly the 
arithmetic mean of scenarios. These summaries can be understood as scenarios of their 
own (Gordon 2009a, 5), and allow showing a range of thousands of simulated scenarios 
on a single graph. Any and all of them may be compared against the initial base scenario 
which is free from expert judgments. 
3.2.1 Critical evaluation of TIA 
The author has written about TIA before (Karhapää 2019), and some of the same findings 
are repeated here. The most obvious criticism of TIA is the questionable nature of expert 
judgments about the future, on a general level. This subject echoes the anti-forecasting 
philosophy of value investors and is also connected to the necessary use of projection in 
DCFs. Expert judgment is a common information source in other (more popular) futures 
studies methods than TIA, such as the Delphi method. However, just because experts are 
used widely does not mean that their use should be immune to criticism. Armstrong 
(1980) showed through numerous examples that formal expertise in a subject is not help-
ful in forecasting future changes, beyond a minimum threshold of understanding the 
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basics of the subject being evaluated, and that a high level of expertise can reduce judg-
ment accuracy. Makridakis & Taleb (2009, 717) take this to the extreme, stating that “in 
the great majority of situations, predictions are never accurate”, and arguing that only in 
the domains of physics and engineering can experts reliably assess the probability and 
uncertainty of future events in advance. Makridakis & Taleb (2009, 727) also suggest that 
finance is conclusive proof that human expert judgment is no better or even worse than 
random chance, as the majority of professional investors tend to underperform a simple 
market capitalization weighted stock index over a long period of time. In psychology 
literature, judgment failures are attributed to behavioral errors, such as “anchoring, dom-
inance effects, and overconfidence, which can severely distort technical judgments” (Ha-
nea et al. 2018, 1781). However, Koehler & Tversky (1994, 565) researched the ways in 
which experts form subjective probability judgments, and concluded that despite real 
challenges, subjective probability should not be dismissed because “in general, there are 
no alternative procedures for assessing uncertainty”. The application of any methods that 
use expert judgment – including TIA – requires, at least, an understanding that the scien-
tific basis of making expert judgments about the future is still underdeveloped and inher-
ently risky.  
Gordon has consistently argued, since the origins of the TIA method, that its useful-
ness is not in better objective predictive accuracy, but in making stakeholders think about 
the probabilities and impacts of future events using a systematic process, in a way that is 
not done by most quantitative forecasting methods (Gordon & Stover 1976, 192; Gordon 
2009a, 7). Humans may find it difficult, awkward, or even offensive to be asked to place 
numeric odds on forecasts, “but that’s a weak argument against change” (Tetlock & Gard-
ner 2015, 33). The simple act of estimating probabilities can reveal unspoken assumptions 
behind the subject discussed, may lead to the new sharing of relevant information (ibid, 
134) and potentially increases awareness that the real range of possible outcomes is prob-
abilistic – not only a binary “fifty-fifty” situation. Such results were found by Barnes 
(2016, 333) and others. Based on results collected from multiple annual forecasting com-
petitions, Tetlock & Gardner (2015, 132) claim that carefully composed small teams of 
experts could cooperatively make probability judgments that are 10-20% more accurate 
than the aggregated judgment of randomly chosen individuals and prediction markets 
(“the wisdom of the crowds”). 
The probability and impact judgments taken individually do not provide the full value 
of the TIA method. After running a simulation, it is possible to compare scenarios and 
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obtain a weighted picture of probability and impact – the mean of all scenarios is essen-
tially the “expected value” of the simulation. Perhaps TIA could help conclude that a 
probable TIA statement on its own would not be that impactful compared to other state-
ments, or maybe an unlikely but high impact statement should not be dismissed, because 
it alone can completely alter the base scenario to a larger degree than the combined effect 
of some other statements. Because TIA provides this comparison of how different phe-
nomena are estimated to act together, a concrete decision-making contribution of TIA 
may be that it directs attention to the most critical phenomena, and also helps exclude 
unimportant trends and events from further analysis (Gordon 2009a, 6). 
After identifying the most critical TIA statements, its users could in some cases even 
affect the related odds and impacts by taking some action in the present, altering the future 
to their favor (Gordon 2009a, 7). This may be the most concrete way how TIA can trans-
late from simulations to strategic action. A clear prerequisite in practice is that the users 
must be somehow capable of influencing the phenomena in question. This is very context-
specific and depends on the actor’s relation to the subject. 
Referring back to the futures cone, PMT scenarios and TIA do not ask what prefera-
ble futures would be like. Gordon (1992, 26-27) classifies TIA in the category of explor-
ative methods, where plausible or probable futures are studied, instead of preferable fu-
tures. The starting point of TIA, trend extrapolation, is quite literally only about asking 
what would happen if the current trend continues when nothing changes in the conditions 
affecting it. It appears that at least beginning from value-neutrality is a necessity for per-
forming a TIA in a logical fashion. However, in further stages/rounds of analysis, there 
is no reason why one could not add or eliminate trends based on normative criteria, to 
show how preferable futures could be reached. Normative statements can very realisti-
cally enter TIA via the participation of experts, especially because interpersonal debate 
about the trends and events is encouraged by Gordon (2009a, 7). On the other hand, there 
is some evidence that personal values could distort forecasting accuracy (Tetlock & Gard-
ner 2015, 134). Still, ultimately “forecasting is not value-free” (Gordon 1992, 26). 
A concern with using best-fit functions in extrapolating the base scenario is that this 
is not necessarily at all realistic, even when working with simple, narrowly defined trends. 
Yet, Gordon (2009a, 3) has used the best-fit function approach to extrapolate trends as 
complex as global gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, ten years to the future. Bell 
(1997, 80-81) argues that trend extrapolation is incorrect most of the time in cases where 
the subject is a system affected by human behavior. Gordon (1992, 32) has clearly 
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acknowledged this, emphasizing that trend extrapolation is just a starting point, and Gor-
don & Stover (1976, 197) mention that human judgment may act as a substitute for best-
fit functions in extrapolation for the base scenario. However, making many human judg-
ments about the trend already before the actual judgment stage arguably defeats the entire 
purpose of the TIA process. Therefore, it seems like “interfering” with the extrapolation 
should be done only when there is a very clear reason to “correct” it. For example, it may 
be that a trend does have a known, inarguably definite, lower or upper limit, like in natural 
sciences. 
In his writings about TIA, Gordon does not discuss whether the initial list of TIA 
statements should strive to contain a balanced ratio of phenomena that might have posi-
tive or negative impacts on the trend. The answer can be deduced to be no, for two rea-
sons. First, there is no reason to assume that the full range of generated PMT scenarios 
should necessarily represent a normal or symmetric distribution. Doing so might be re-
sorting to argumentum ad temperantiam, the idea that there must be a balance or a golden 
mean (Fisher 2010, 113). In reality, asymmetry does exist, and might create opportunity 
to some who are able to spot it and act on it. The second reason is that before the expert 
judgments are given, there is actually no way to tell whether impacts will be judged as 
positive or negative. That is up to the experts involved, not the initial list. Additionally, 
the direction of impacts could vary temporally; e.g. an event can have a negative effect 
on the trend for the first few time periods, but then turn positive. 
In theory, a longer list of TIA statements could result in more accurate or realistic 
PMT scenarios, and there is no upper limit. In practice, the tradeoff is that each statement 
adds several demanding mental tasks to the experts participating in the judgment process. 
In this respect, TIA also compares much more favorably against its close relative, the CIA 
method, where the same number of statements being evaluated requires almost a squared 
number of individual estimates (Gordon 2009b, 13). Additionally, it must be understood 
as a prerequisite of using TIA that the list of events analyzed will never be exhaustive, 
and Gordon (2009a, 7) has very clearly addressed this criticism. Only a strictly defined 
list of phenomena is explicitly analyzed. TIA does not attempt to map out the entire fu-
tures cone. 
For summarizing and analyzing the scenarios produced, Gordon (2009a, 5) does not 
suggest going further than showing descriptive measures of variability in the form of the 
minimum, quartiles and maximum, as well as the mean. Indeed, statistical inference does 
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not seem necessary or useful, due to the fact that a TIA is based on subjective judgments 
to begin with. 
As a matter of practicality, it is remarkable that TIA has become considerably easier 
to perform since the 1970’s when the method was first developed. In particular, the com-
puting power required to run thousands of Monte Carlo simulations in a short time is no 
longer a costly barrier. On the other hand, it should be noted that at the time of writing, 
no special-purpose software for performing TIA appears to be available publicly. Gordon 
(2009a) implies that all applications by The Futures Group were done using proprietary 
programs, and Bradfield et al. (2005, 809) have reasoned that this lack of publicly avail-
able tools could be a reason for why TIA and CIA are not very popular. However, each 
step of the required calculations in TIA can be coded into programs like Microsoft Excel 
by following Gordon’s (2009a) clearly written description of the process, as is done in 
this thesis. 
Like most methods in futures studies, TIA seems to be used for specific cases and 
projects that are surrounded by unique circumstances. The method is simple and very 
flexible: it could be used with most, if not all, quantifiable trends, regardless of the field 
or domain. Thanks to its simplicity and its rather adaptable nature, TIA can be easily used 
in conjunction with other methods, like “to add quantification” to scenarios in the other 
non-PMT schools of scenarios (Gordon 2009a, 7). However, due to the case nature of 
applications, documented cases of TIA are not fully replicable and have limited external 
validity. This makes it challenging to truly evaluate or improve the method. There do 
exist newer versions of TIA, created by researchers other than Gordon. Some of them 
could have advantages over the original method. For instance, as an additional dimension 
of depth, Agami et al. (2008, 1441) applied three degrees of severity (low, medium and 
high) to the estimations of impact. On the more complex end of modifications, Lee et al. 
(2015) incorporate neural networks and fuzzy logic to TIA. In this thesis, the original TIA 
method as described by Gordon (2009a) is chosen over any variants because of its relative 
simplicity and because there is no clear evidence that the variants are better. Additionally, 
publicly documented use of the original version is limited to begin with; this thesis could 
contribute one more such case.  
While Gordon (2009a) has suggested that TIA is used frequently, actual references 
in journal articles seem very limited, based on the systematic literature review. This is not 
a new finding, as researchers including Bradfield et al. (2005, 801), Hennen & Benninga 
(2009, 19), and Amer et al. (2013) have made the exact same remark. It appears that TIA 
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has become rare, even obscure, since the 1970’s when it was invented. In that sense, it is 
still not fully proven as a method. 
3.2.2 Existing use of TIA with DCFs 
The literature review did not find any occurrences of TIA being used to analyze the future 
cash flows of an investment from journal articles. Likewise, generic internet searches do 
not appear to find any cases. In an earlier essay by the author (Karhapää 2019, 121), 
applications of TIA and CIA were reviewed on a general level, but no applications to 
financial topics were identified. 
However, even though there is no published evidence, it is still possible that some-
thing similar to what is proposed in this thesis has been performed before. Gordon’s use 
of the method with The Futures Group appears to have been mainly in the context of 
confidential consulting projects with clients (Gordon & Stover 1976, 211). Some of those 
cases may well have involved cash flow forecasting. At least sales and costs trends were 
analyzed in the early projects of The Futures Group (ibid, 200-202), and those financial 
accounts are ultimately connected to a cash flow statement.  
According to Jain (1984, 125), at least 83 (45% of 186 surveyed) CEOs of Fortune 
500 companies in the United States had used TIA at least once to process the results of 
horizon scanning activities between 1982-1984. That result suggests that TIA may have 
been popular in high-level corporate strategy at that time, although the figure can be ques-
tioned, compared to the rarity of publicly documented uses of the TIA method. Neverthe-
less, as those TIAs were performed by highly competitive multinational corporations, it 
is very plausible that a part of the applications could have involved cash flow forecasting. 
As a named example from the same time, General Electric used TIA in the mid-stage of 
a larger scenario planning process, apparently for forecasting industrial indicators (Taylor 
1984, 61). To contextualize the scope of this, General Electric was the 10th largest com-
pany in the Fortune 500 in 1984 (Fortune Magazine 2005). However, at the time of writ-
ing this thesis, there is no evidence that TIA is at all used in corporate strategy, and it 
appears TIA’s real popularity has considerably fallen since the 1980’s.  
In the 1970’s, when the TIA and CIA methods were recently invented, Blackman Jr. 
(1973, 242) suggested using CIA for cash flows and profit. Jensen (1979, 194) did also 
call for using CIA and related probabilistic methods (which include TIA) in accounting 
research, emphasizing the argument that qualitative human input should be integrated to 
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quantitative forecasting. Ultimately, it does not appear that the call has ever been re-
sponded to. 
3.2.3 Other futures studies methods in finance 
As a side result of the literature search, some applications of futures studies methods 
(other than TIA) to financial and valuation related issues were found. 
Estimating the “social net present value” of public projects and societal phenomena 
has been an area of study in futures studies. Examples published in the journal “Futures” 
include Anderson (2013), Greene et al. (2014), and Kula (2015). Evans et al. (1992) ap-
plied the Delphi method to the budgeting of socially responsible capital spending, for net 
present value calculations in different scenarios where corporate projects may have value 
for external stakeholders (as opposed to only shareholders). 
Specifically related to private investment in the real estate industry, in a survey of 71 
professionals in the field, Brodowicz (2013, 236) found that only a minority would have 
been interested in applying futures studies methods to the valuation of real estate. How-
ever, the result is limited to a specific context and is inconclusive about the extent to 
which futures studies methods are applicable to valuation topics, or not. 
Fontela (2000) recognized that there exists an academic gap between futurists and 
economists: “the lack of confidence of econometric modellers in futures research is only 
equalled by its reverse” (ibid, 11). He hypothesized that the reason is that futures studies 
is more interested in long-term structural changes in society, while models of economic 
phenomena may be more short-term oriented and exclude non-economic causes of sys-
temic changes (ibid, 12). Based on the literature review here, this disconnect appears to 
apply not only to economics, but also to accounting and finance. 
3.3 Discounted cash flow (DCF) 
Discounted cash flow (DCF) models are essentially mathematical formulae that estimate 
the intrinsic value of an asset. There exist many different variants, but equation (1) from 
Damodaran (2006, 117) represents a generic DCF model for valuing a business. 
 
 
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 = ∑
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where E(CFt) is expected cash flow, t is individual time periods, n is a forecast period 
defined in years, TV is terminal value, and r is the discount rate. The valuation output is 
an estimation of the present value of all cash flows that will be earned in the future. Indi-
vidual time periods t in a DCF are mainly years, the most common unit of temporal meas-
urement in accounting and finance. n is a defined period for which cash flows are fore-
casted; its length in DCFs is up to 10 years (Damodaran 2006, 118). This period is similar 
to the forecast period in a TIA. 
Expected cash flows, E(CFt), are defined differently in each specific DCF variant. 
“Free cash flow”, in general, is the difference of cash inflows and outflows. It is cash 
available for allocation to strategic expansion, debt paydowns, dividends or share repur-
chases (Damodaran 2006, 79-80). There are two main categorizations of cash flow, de-
pending on who the cash flows are attributable to (Hitchner 2017, 128). The most com-
plete definition used in free cash flow to firm (FCFF) models is free cash flow to all 
investors, debt and equity. Free cash flow to equity (FCFE) variants assign value to the 
free cash flows that “belong” to only equity holders. Lastly, a dividend discount model 
(DDM) is the simplest possible DCF that ignores the complete picture of cash flow and 
only focuses on a part of it, dividends that are paid to shareholders (Damodaran 2006, 
14). 
Regardless of how cash flows are defined, the main approaches to find their expected 
future values are to either extrapolate historical data, or to create a detailed forecast for 
each individual period (year) in the forecast period, by fundamental analysis of the busi-
ness and its operating environment (Ruback 2011, 8). The consensus of such forecasts by 
multiple analysts can be used (Damodaran 2006, 15), which is interestingly not unlike the 
aggregation of expert opinions that is used as a source in some futures studies methods. 
Either way, a typical single-scenario DCF model shows one set of expected cash flows, 
that can be theoretically understood as a projected future in the futures cone framework. 
Terminal value TV is an abstraction of the future value of the business, after the fore-
cast period has ended (Damodaran 2006, 143). The most common assumption for termi-
nal value is that the business will settle to a stable growth rate that it could sustain theo-
retically forever (ibid, 117), which is represented in equation (1) above. It is important to 
note that the rate of terminal growth is an average, not an exact figure that will definitely 
be realized every year in the future (Hitchner 2017, 146). A general test of plausibility for 
terminal growth rates is that they should be in the low single digits, not above known 
averages of GDP growth (Pratt & Grabowski 2014, 461; Hitchner 2017, 1215). 
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The discount rate, r, adds the concepts of timing and risk to the calculation (Damo-
daran 2006, 27-28). Klarman (1991, 231) defines the discount rate as “the rate of interest 
that would make an investor indifferent between present and future dollars”. The “time 
value of money” is a central concept here: any given amount of cash is assumedly worth 
more now than in the future, even if its face value remains the same (Rutherford 2013, 
596), due to the opportunity cost of not investing (and inflation). The discount rate also 
reflects risk, which is variation from the expected cash flows E(CFt), not only to the 
downside but also to the upside (Damodaran 2006, 27-28). There is a recognition that the 
expected cash flows are not necessarily going to be realized as projected. The effect of 
the discount rate r in equation (1) is that when the discount rate is increased, the more is 
“demanded” from an investment, and so the resulting value will be lower. This relation-
ship works inversely, too. Therefore, less risky investments would be discounted at a 
lower rate than higher risk investments. 
There are a few distinct ways to determine the discount rate r. Two explained here 
are the “cost of capital” and the “hurdle rate”. Both are relevant for this thesis and will be 
used later. The cost of capital is the return that all investors (in equity and debt) demand 
from a particular investment. For FCFE and DDM models, the cost of equity is applicable 
as a discount rate. It is the cost of the share capital, specific to the business being analyzed 
in the DCF (Damodaran 2007, 28). In practice, it is not a real figure that can be read from 
any price tag. The cost of equity is modelled using (academic) risk and return models 
(ibid, 29). Of those, the most common, “default” model used to find the cost of equity is 
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) which can be used to compare the risk of invest-
ing in a particular business against others (Pratt & Grabowski 2014, 89). This is called 
“systematic risk” (Hitchner 2017, 194). CAPM is applied in this thesis as a comparison 
against the hurdle rate approach. 
A very different way to determine the discount rate is the hurdle rate. The hurdle rate 
is an entirely subjective figure. Broadly it is “the minimum rate of return to an investment 
project to justify it being undertaken” (Rutherford 2013, 274). The hurdle rate is deter-
mined by the actor who performs the DCF, and it is not necessarily arrived to using any 
real methods. For example, Klarman (1991, 127) explains that some analysts simply de-
mand a 10% annual return from every investment they analyze, using that fixed figure as 
an “all-purpose” discount rate. 
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3.3.1 Critical evaluation of DCFs 
As theorized, it is not objectively clear what kind of a future a DCF actually represents in 
the futures cone, even if it aims to show the expected value, the projected future in the 
center of probable futures. Criticisms against all forecasting of future financial data, from 
practitioners of value investing, naturally apply to DCFs. The same issues of accuracy 
that TIA has seem to be also directly shared by DCFs when forecasting expected cash 
flows, whether this is done with trend extrapolation or expert judgment, or a mix of both. 
Indeed, a key problem that applies to all variations of DCFs is how to accurately 
estimate the three main inputs: future cash flows, their growth rate, and the discount rate, 
and how to evaluate the quality of these estimations (Carlisle 2014, 112). For instance, a 
landmark statistical study on several hundred publicly listed companies across many in-
dustries by Little (1962) found that past earnings growth is not correlated with realized 
future earnings beyond a period of four years. 30 years later, a direct response made by 
Fuller et al. (1992) did not offer countering evidence, but instead reframed the issue by 
concluding that a marketplace as an aggregate is usually able to forecast business growth 
prospects, at least better than individuals. However, that offers little comfort to those par-
ties who are interested in actively improving their DCF inputs. 
Errors in the DCF inputs will inform the valuation output. This is known as the “gar-
bage in, garbage out” concept (Damodaran 2007, 155). The percentage rates used for 
growth and discounting will compound in the long-term. DCF mistakes are not obvious 
in advance. Their “seeming precision” can cause “a false sense of certainty” in decision-
makers, which ultimately can lead to poor investments (Klarman 1991, 119). There is a 
similarity to TIA here. Both TIA and DCF are built on equations that appear theoretically 
sound, but their practical application is extremely sensitive to subjective inputs. There is 
no certain way to tell how correct inputs were, mainly because these models are used in 
non-repeatable contexts. 
All ways of finding discount rates have challenges. On the risk and return models, 
when it comes to the CAPM, its underlying assumptions are the most frequent area of 
criticism (Rutherford 2013, 71-72). Those assumptions include that the financial markets 
have perfect competition, where investors are rational actors that hold diversified portfo-
lios and are able to borrow unlimited money at “risk-free rates” (the practically guaran-
teed rate of return that can be received from government bonds) (ibid). Fama & French 
(2004) argue that not only are the assumptions of the CAPM questionable, but that most 
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of its empirical applications are not necessarily valid, despite the fact that it remains in 
widespread use. On the other hand, countering findings continue to exist; for example, 
Hundal et al. (2019) have recently shown, using historical data from the Finnish stock 
market, that the CAPM could have been used to create stock portfolios with less volatility 
and the same returns as the market in a specific time period. 
The subjective hurdle rate approach to find discount rates is also inherently problem-
atic. While the CAPM is critiqued for idealistic assumptions, subjective discount rates do 
not have any standardized set of assumptions that they are based on. They are simply up 
to what a decision-maker demands from an investment. This approach may lead to over-
simplification, because investments with different risk profiles should be discounted at 
different rates (Klarman 1991, 126). This seems to apply regardless if “risk” is defined as 
price volatility, or as more fundamental risk, related to the idiosyncratic underlying char-
acteristics of a particular asset. 
While Doganova (2013, 3-7) writes about how DCFs may be created as deceitfully 
optimistic projections, “political tools” to persuade decision-makers with too optimistic 
assumptions (of the preferable futures), the opposite is also possible. Ruback (2011) dis-
cusses how the discount rate is often inflated artificially to draw valuation results down, 
with the purpose of combating overly optimistic growth assumptions, and to account for 
unlikely downside risks. The simple act of raising the discount rate can be considered a 
replacement for more detailed scenario analysis, because it immediately makes any valu-
ation more conservative, increasing the margin of safety. In practice, it is much faster to 
increase the discount rate figure than perform more detailed analyses of the assumed cash 
flows. This could be judged as lazy, but the idea is not necessarily a poor one, as it can 
also be viewed as an explicit acknowledgment of the difficulty of analyzing the future. 
Such modification of the discount rate is a form of “sensitivity analysis”, defined later. 
When DCFs are applied to equity investments, Jensen (1986) defined the “agency 
issue of cash flows”: even if a DCF projects cash flows in a realistic manner, there is a 
real possibility that cash flows belong only theoretically to the minority shareholders, 
because it is practically company management and/or the board that chooses how to allo-
cate capital. As an outsider, a way to impact what ultimately is done with cash flows is to 
acquire a large enough holding of shares with voting power, or to convince other share-
holders to vote similarly to oneself, at which point one becomes an “activist investor” 
(Carlisle 2014, 14). This matter is similar to discussed agency limitations that may arise 
in TIA, when it comes to trying to affect critical future phenomena. 
37 
 
There is a temporal aspect to the work of valuation: DCFs done once should be up-
dated as known information changes. For example, when DCFs are used in a business 
strategy context to value internal projects, a strategy itself is often updated regularly, 
while the related DCFs might not be (Whipple III 1989, 82). Whether intrinsic value itself 
changes over time, or just the best estimations of it do, is a deep philosophical question. 
Terminal value forms a large portion, most often a majority, of the total value calcu-
lated (Steiger 2010, 14; Hitchner 2017, 146). Therefore, it is very easy to create both 
overly positive and negative valuations just with that part of the equation. When a fixed 
terminal growth rate is assumed to perpetuity, the theoretical assumption is that cash 
flows will continue to grow, stay flat, or decline, at some average rate forever. This is not 
fully descriptive of the real world, even by common sense. From a legal standpoint, when 
the terminal growth rate is positive, assumptions of perpetual growth have been judged 
too speculative in court decisions (Pratt & Grabowski 2014, 42). 
Terminal value and terminal growth rates are relevant from a futures studies perspec-
tive as well. As the time horizon advances, it seems like a cash flow trend that exists into 
perpetuity will inevitably steer outside the plausible and eventually the possible futures 
(though some businesses have existed for hundreds of years). Historical average GDP 
growth is the typical upper limit to the growth rate that can be assumed, but the usefulness 
of past GDP growth as a guidepost to its future can be questioned. The long-term viability 
of economic expansion has been a subject of research in futures studies, most famously 
in the simulation work “The Limits to Growth” by Meadows et. al (1972), where it is 
argued that global economic growth does have real limits imposed by the natural envi-
ronment, and that those limits may be reached before the end of the current century (ibid, 
23, 142). 
Other approaches to the matter of terminal value may circumvent the imperfections 
of the perpetual growth rate. For example, one could assume that the business is liquidated 
or sold to an acquirer after the end of the DCF forecast period, to determine a value at 
that point (Hitchner 2017, 147-151). Such end date approaches can also be inaccurate, for 
example by being too conservative (Pearson 1986, 19). However, the terminal growth 
rate approach is simple and easy to perform, which may explain why it remains commonly 
used. Its practical application does not necessarily require holding an uncompromising 
belief in its assumptions. 
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3.3.2 Existing scenario methods with DCFs 
In finance literature, there seem to be at least two recognized main reasons to incorporate 
scenario thinking to valuation. The first is to influence how the future is thought about. 
Damodaran (2018, 6) argues that the single figures that are the output of most DCFs can 
fool some decision-makers into believing in the “precision” of that number – this could 
be the case even if the DCF is a result of real probabilistic weighting work that was carried 
out in the background, but is omitted from the presentation of results. Graham & Dodd’s 
(1951, 71) criticism of financial projections, that they can be misunderstood as if they are 
a fact, is similar. Therefore, an explicitly shown range of valuation could perhaps com-
municate the uncertainty of valuation better than one figure does. The other reason is that 
scenario thinking in valuation could perhaps improve its predictive power. This idea is 
supported by some empirical studies, like Joos et al. (2016), who compared analyst esti-
mations against realized outcomes, and found that a narrower range of analyst-made sce-
narios did imply higher realized certainty in the future, or Kadous et al. (2006), who pre-
sented counterfactuals about the future to analysts as a balance to optimistic forecasts. 
The most comprehensive existing summary of scenario methods with DCFs is writ-
ten by Damodaran (2018), and methods from that piece are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Scenario methods used with DCFs. Adapted from Damodaran (2018). 
 
Name of 
method 
Purpose 
Number of 
scenarios 
Logic of scenario creation 
Expected 
value 
Find probability-
weighted average of 
valuation 
One 
Forecast cash flows, and implicitly build-
in assumptions for all possible future 
values multiplied by their probabilities 
Sensitivity 
analysis 
Test model robustness 
to changes in inputs 
Unlimited 
Quantitative manipulation of model 
inputs 
Three-point 
estimation 
Find value in “base-
case,” “best-case” & 
“worst-case” 
Three 
Take expected value as “base-case”, 
and define “best-case” & “worst-case” 
using an optimism-pessimism axis 
Multiple 
scenarios 
Find value in discrete, 
unique scenarios 
Few 
Create qualitatively distinctive 
scenarios, forecast cash flows 
separately for each 
Simulation 
approaches 
Simulate expected 
value & valuation distri-
bution across large 
number of scenarios 
>100 
Define probability distributions for all 
parameters in DCF and run a Monte 
Carlo simulation 
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“Expected value” is the probability-weighted average of future cash flows. This is what 
is intended in the conventional single-scenario DCF. All possible future values multiplied 
by their probabilities are supposed to be built into expected value – however, analyses 
actually attempting to do so are likely not commonly performed in practice when doing 
DCFs (Ruback 2011, 8; Klarman 1991, 128). This observation might support the use of 
methods that take more explicit practical steps to define probabilistic outcomes. The term 
“expected value” originates from gambling calculations, reflecting how much can theo-
retically be lost in or gained from a bet (Vogt 2005, 111). Yet this gambling analogue 
does not necessarily fully extend to investing; games of chance are closed systems that 
can be reliably studied in repeated experiments, and so are more predictable than unique 
businesses at a specific point in time. 
“Sensitivity analysis” refers to modifying one or more inputs in a systems model and 
observing how that change affects the output. This simple exercise can logically reveal 
which inputs (assumptions) are the most critical for the end result. It could also be used 
to find potential errors in the logic of models. Sensitivity analyses do not originate from 
finance and are used frequently in different disciplines for various modeling purposes. In 
a DCF, the most important variables of a sensitivity analysis include the cash flows, the 
discount rate and the terminal growth rate; Klarman (1991, 128) suggests that these are 
what sensitivity analyses should focus on, although any and all of the smaller sub-param-
eters in a DCF could also be tested separately. One obvious strength of sensitivity analysis 
is that it takes little to no effort. A weakness is that on its own, it does not study the reasons 
or explanations for why the inputs would actually change. In their classification of sce-
nario methods in futures studies, Bishop et al. (2007, 16-17) classify both sensitivity anal-
yses and TIA in their “Modeling” category. It is highly questionable if the result of a 
sensitivity analysis can be considered a “scenario”, if it is nothing more than the manip-
ulation of a single variable without any more narration or judgment (Glenn 2009, 2). 
In “three-point estimation” DCFs, first the expected value is taken as a base-case 
scenario. Then, the analyst considers two extreme alternative futures from the point of 
view of the investor. These are the “worst” and “best” scenarios. Cash flows are estimated 
for both of these extreme scenarios to define a valuation range. For instance, the invest-
ment bank Morgan Stanley has moved from using expected value as the standard, to three-
point estimation, in order to better estimate and show the inherent uncertainty in valuation 
(Joos et al. 2016, 646). An advantage of three-point estimation can be that it is relatively 
easily processed and understood by decision-makers, given the ease of visualizing three 
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lines on a graph. How exactly are “worst” and “best” defined? This is not only a rhetorical 
question, because the terms do not seem to have universally standardized meanings. For 
example, for any equity investment, a “worst” case would always be zero, which in itself 
is not very useful information (Damodaran 2018, 6). As a remarkable parallel in futures 
studies, Herman Kahn, who may be called the “father” of scenarios (Glenn 2009, 1), also 
did promote thinking in terms a base scenario, a best case, and a worst case (ibid), though 
since the 1970’s, the scenario paradigm in futures studies has shifted to other approaches. 
Kahn’s definition of the “best case” involved a combination of good luck and good man-
agement, and vice versa for the “worst case” (ibid). 
The “multiple scenarios” approach works by identifying the fundamentally most im-
portant drivers of a business, and then imagining what its operating environment would 
be like in qualitatively distinctive scenarios that are combinations of extreme ends of 
those key drivers. For example, with two key drivers, the result could be visualized as a 
two-by-two matrix. A separate DCF is then done for each scenario. It is possible to add 
subjective estimates of probabilities, which allows for an odds-weighted range of valua-
tion, but this is not necessary. These scenarios should be very different, in some ways 
opposite from each other, so that the analysis captures a large range of outcomes (Damo-
daran 2018, 7; Klarman 1991, 128). Compared to three-point estimation, the process by 
which multiple scenarios are created is arguably more rigorous and deductive, because 
the analysts do not begin by thinking by conclusive statements like “best-case”. 
Notably, the multiple scenarios method in valuation is very similar to the popular 
intuitive logics school of scenarios in futures studies. It could well be that there has been 
some historical link in the development of these approaches in the two disciplines, per-
haps because the intuitive logics school was originally popularized after its successful use 
in a corporate context at Shell International (Glenn 2009, 1). The potentially significant 
overlap – or even identicality – between “multiple scenarios” and “intuitive logics” ap-
pears to be a ripe area of further study for any futurists seeking to make their scenarios 
more tangible for those stakeholders who are also concerned with the financial outcomes 
in each scenario. The simplest practical suggestion to do so would be to add a DCF cal-
culation to each scenario in an intuitive logics work. Like believers in intuitive logics 
scenarios in futures studies, users of multiple scenarios DCFs in finance seem to empha-
size the inherent unpredictability of the operating environment: “scenario reasoning […] 
is a reaction to the fact that most predictions are mistaken” (Mills & Weinstein 1996, 79). 
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“Simulation approaches” create a range of quantitative outputs, that might be classi-
fiable as scenarios, by defining probabilistic distributions to many of the sub-parameters 
that form the main parameters of the DCF (e.g. profit margins, business growth and the 
like) and then running a very high number of independent simulations of the model, gen-
erally with the Monte Carlo approach (Damodaran 2018, 21-24). Not every parameter is 
necessarily treated as independent; interrelationships may be taken into account with cor-
relations (ibid). Probabilities are continuous, in that some scenarios will contain elements 
of other scenarios. An advantage of using simulations with DCFs is that they might be 
the most realistic approach, as not only the extreme ends of key drivers, but also other 
unintuitive combinations, are explored. A main challenge is deciding what are the param-
eters that should be simulated, and what is their source, especially if historical data is 
unavailable (Damodaran 2018, 22).  
Out of the DCF scenario methods examined, it is simulation approaches that seem to 
be the closest to what is done in TIA, though there are significant differences. In both, the 
Monte Carlo simulation is common, and the result is a range of scenarios that can be 
described in probabilistic terms. A central difference is how probability inputs are given. 
TIA works with subjective probabilities that are more or less just opinions, expressed as 
numbers. TIA is also done “bottom-up”, individually for possible statements that are 
causally independent from each other, and never assumes that the whole range of possible 
futures can be described; the set of TIA statements is always limited. Conversely, in sim-
ulation approaches to valuation, as described by Damodaran (2018, 22-47), the main ap-
proach to probability is objective probability, based primarily on historical data. Com-
pared to TIA, distributions are defined for each parameter more in a “top-down” manner, 
where it may be even assumed that every possible event, risk and outcome is captured by 
chosen probability distributions. TIA seems to require less statistical and mathematical 
expertise, because users do not have to be intimately familiar with different types of dis-
tributions. It also explicitly invites the use of imagination and interpersonal discourse to 
the analysis of unprecedented events, even where historical data does not exist. 
What can be concluded at this stage is that TIA is distinct from the types of scenario 
methods that are already used with DCFs, particularly in how TIA works through a spe-
cific list of impactful future events or trends. Each of the methods listed in Table 1 have 
slightly different purposes and produce different types of scenarios. There does not seem 
to exist any conclusive comparison study that would indicate which of them is overall 
“best” by some definition. Practical choice between methods can be a matter of how much 
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time and resources are available for analysis work, what level of analysis is warranted, 
and even preferences: e.g. it can be that a simple sensitivity analysis is more often justified 
than a complex simulation. TIA is not necessarily superior to the rest, either – it should 
be tried in practice to be able to conclude more. 
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4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1 Overview 
This section explains the empirical research design choices made in this particular project. 
It needs to be noted that actual data collected and other realized results are not discussed 
in this section; they are only discussed in the next section. The intended output of the 
research is a DDM valuation of the stock of a “Case Company” (Olvi Oyj), based on 
10,000 PMT scenarios made using TIA. It is vital to understand that prioritizing that end 
result is the main factor that influences how all other choices in research design are made. 
Another important influencing factor is to stay within the practical limits of a master’s 
thesis format. Figure 3 is a flowchart presentation of the research design.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Research design. 
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The main processes and methods are grouped into areas, and the important “moving 
parts” between them are shown in Figure 3. The following subsections describe these 
choices in detail, including how TIA and DDM methods are adapted in order to combine 
them, and how choices guide other decisions in other parts of the process.  
4.2 Participants: Retail investors 
The use of expert judgment is a defining part of the traditional form of TIA by Gordon 
(2009a), and in this thesis, the role of experts is to be filled by retail (amateur) investors 
who are familiar with the Case Company. This is done mainly for a practical reason: there 
is no easy access to a group of professionals in the industry, like equity analysts or port-
folio managers, who would be willing to participate in this project. Professionals would 
also potentially undertake career risks if they contributed to a project like this, depending 
on their individual circumstances; e.g. equity analysts can have a strict set of guidelines 
about what they can communicate to external parties about the companies they analyze. 
The choice of retail investors is also backed up by arguments discussed earlier – when 
making judgments or forecasts about the future, there may be no meaningful provable 
difference between the abilities of professional experts and ordinary people. “Don't hire 
the best expert, hire the cheapest expert”, as Armstrong (1980, 16) concluded. Maubous-
sin (2007, 44) implies that the conclusion seems to extend to probabilistic domains with 
high degrees of freedom, specifically including the analysis of publicly traded stocks.  
As for the level of competence that should be assumed from participants, it is sup-
posed here that average retail investors are familiar with at least income statements, but 
not necessarily with a combination of all three financial statements (income statements, 
balance sheets and cash flow statements). For example, a recent study of Swedish retail 
investors by Stålnacke (2019) suggests that individuals are more likely to make their stock 
investment decisions using filtered information, such as news media or discussions with 
friends, than unfiltered information which means financial statements from primary 
sources, the company whose stock is being analyzed. However, because the purpose here 
is to create inputs for a DDM rather than a “fuller” DCF, this should be acceptable. More 
advanced DCF variants would likely require a more trained participant base, where it 
could be reasonably assumed that they have a high familiarity with accounting. 
When it comes to collecting expert judgments, Gordon’s writings on the subject 
mainly describe a situation of behavioral aggregation, where the experts are able discuss 
each judgment together and reach a consensus. In this thesis project, it is a real practical 
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concern how much time and effort participants are willing to dedicate to it. It is not plau-
sible to invite participants to an extensive workshop session where they could debate the 
topics in depth. The best option for data collection appears to be via online survey tools 
– especially because the time of data collection happens to be May 2020, during a national 
state of emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Potential participants are contacted through Shareville, a social network site for Nor-
dic retail investors created by the Nordnet brokerage (Shareville AB 2020). On the web-
site, there are discussion pages for individual companies listed on the Nordic stock mar-
kets, including the Case Company of this project. Participants will be people invited from 
the pool of investors who read discussions on the Shareville page of the Case Company. 
Communication with participants is the main ethical (and legal) area of concern in 
this project, especially because the topic could involve their personal wealth if they are 
invested in the Case Company. To minimize such concerns, several disclaimers are 
clearly stated to the participants before they can participate to the project. The disclaimer 
text is in its original Finnish language in Appendix 2. The content is summarized here:  
 
1) Shareville, Nordnet or the Case Company do not have any involvement in the 
project. 
2) Participation is voluntary and anonymous. Participants will not be contacted 
about the project later. 
3) The Surveys are not a recommendation to trade any stocks or other securities. 
4) The thesis author does not own investments in the Case Company and will not 
initiate any positions in a month after the Surveys. 
5) The project is non-profit seeking and experimental in nature. 
 
Contact information of the thesis author is also shared with participants. 
4.3 Case Company: Olvi Oyj 
In this thesis, it is not of primary importance which exact company is studied, as the main 
objective is more related to a demonstration of methods. With this in mind, criteria for 
company choice are defined to support the research process, not to pursue an actual in-
vestment. In addition to the requirement of it being a publicly listed company, four criteria 
are considered: 
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1) Availability of historical data about the business, to create the TIA base scenario 
2) Financial year aligned with the calendar year, for fitment of TIA & DDM meth-
ods 
3) Presence on “Shareville” investor social media site, for access to retail investors 
who could participate in this study 
4) Simplicity, stability and slow change in the industry and business, to potentially 
improve predictability, following value investing philosophy 
 
Olvi Oyj (Olvi) is a company that is judged to fulfill the four criteria. It is a producer of 
alcoholic and nonalcoholic drinks, listed on the Nasdaq Helsinki stock exchange, with a 
market capitalization of ~843 M € at the time of writing (Morningstar 2020a). The busi-
ness is headquartered in Iisalmi, Finland. Other markets and countries of operation are 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Belarus. Individual countries are also the reporting seg-
ments of the company. 
Olvi has two classes of shares (Olvi Group 2020a, 4). 82% of these are the publicly 
traded “class A” shares. These “class A” shares are the subject of analysis in this thesis. 
These shares trade with the ticker “OLVAS”. The remaining 18% portion of shares are 
“class K”, and are not traded publicly. The fundamental difference is that each “class K” 
share provides twenty times more votes than one “class A” share does. Both classes of 
shares have equal rights to dividends (ibid). 
For the first criterion, the historical data that is immediately available for Olvi is 
mainly in the form of annual reports for the years 2002-2019 (Olvi Group 2020b). Key 
figures from that data are provided in Appendix 3. This 18-year long documented history 
serves as a source that can be extrapolated from to create a TIA base scenario. Crucially, 
the time period captures more than one economic cycle in Olvi’s markets. For example, 
in Finland the years 2009 to 2017 may be considered a long recessionary or stagnant 
period, due to unemployment rates never reaching the 2008 lows of 6.37% (Plecher 
2020). It seems like using data that broadly captures both “good” and “bad” macroeco-
nomic times might be a realistic starting point for extrapolation. 
For the second criterion, Olvi’s financial year is fully aligned with the calendar year 
from January 1 to December 31. This is very useful, because time periods in a TIA are 
generally understood in calendar years, while a DDM works with financial years. If they 
are equivalent, then the task of making expert judgments does not require any further 
temporal adjustment, and a potential source of confusion can be avoided. For the third 
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criterion, at the time of writing, Olvi had 853 verified retail shareholders on the Shareville 
social network, and potentially more people following the page (Shareville AB 2020). 
The fourth criterion originates from theoretical characteristics of a value investing 
framework. Olvi, as a business, is a relatively simple system. It operates in just one in-
dustry, consumer nondurables, that changes slowly. The industry is secular in nature – 
there is a degree of seasonality within years, but no cyclicality across them (Olvi 2020c, 
15). Also, the business typically provides high returns in a very consistent manner, as 
may be observed from Morningstar’s (2020b) summary about Olvi’s operating perfor-
mance. Metrics that measure returns on capital, such as return on equity or return on in-
vested capital, tend to be greater than 15% (ibid). Olvi has not made a net loss during the 
entire 18-year period in Appendix 3. Sales revenue grew in all of those years except 2015. 
The products or operations of the company do not require major ongoing research and 
development activities to achieve new innovation: annual research and development 
spending is approximately 0.2% of revenue (Olvi Group 2020a, 34). 
Furthermore, Olvi has demonstrated its longevity by simply surviving multiple times 
longer than the average business does. It has existed since 1878, making it technically 
older than the country in which it is headquartered (Olvi Group 2020c). Olvi is arguably 
a living example of Taleb’s (2012, 316-318) Lindy heuristic, explained earlier: while the 
world has changed massively around Olvi in the past century, with society-shaping events 
like wars and the industrialization megatrend passing on around it, the consumption of 
mass-produced beer, soft drinks and other beverages continues with no end in sight. These 
facts should arguably make it easier to do any kind of forecasts or judgments about Olvi 
than most businesses. 
4.4 Base scenario creation 
The classic form of TIA is built around a base scenario, made by trend extrapolation. Two 
beginning considerations are defining the forecast period and the trend that is analyzed in 
TIA. The forecast period for the TIA is defined as 2020-2029, which is ten years (or 
actually about nine and half). Ten years seems like a fairly standard time horizon in both 
TIAs and DDMs. While the accuracy of extrapolating a trend ten years to the future may 
be lower than with a shorter time period, it also would allow the inclusion of a wider 
range of future phenomena in the TIA. Ten years is more than what might be considered 
“short-term” in futures studies (Masini 1993, 32). 
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In this TIA, the trend that is analyzed is the net profit of Olvi, even though it is divi-
dends that will be the input to a DDM. For TIA purposes, net profit seems like a more 
appropriate trend to make expert judgments about than dividends, because profit is more 
directly an output of the performance of the business and will not require the participating 
experts to make their own assumptions about dividend policy. How the simulated net 
profit is converted to dividends for the purpose of the DDM is explained in more detail 
later. 
A potential problem with directly extrapolating Olvi’s net profit account for the base 
scenario is that its definition may have changed multiple times in the past, due to real 
changes in accounting. Such changes may come from the International Financial Report-
ing Standards (IFRS) that the company follows (Olvi Group 2020d, 13) but also possibly 
from the accounting choices that the company itself makes. Given that net profit is at the 
bottom of any income statement, it is impacted by all other accounts before it, and their 
definitions may have varied historically. Compensating for this would require a detailed 
study of Olvi’s accounting going back 18 years and adjusting the data to correct for any 
changes in all items that affect net profit. 
For the sake of saving resources, a shortcut is applied here. The definition of revenue 
probably has changed less than that of net profit, since revenue is the very first item of an 
income statement and is not as dependent on the rest of the accounts. It is still possible 
that revenue recognition policies have changed, but assumedly not as much as the defini-
tion of net profit may have changed. The importance of revenue and how it trickles down 
to profits has been articulated by Hitchner (2017, 1193): “All things being equal, trends 
in revenues will translate into trends in profit margins, as well as the Company’s ultimate 
fate. [sic]” Therefore, by first extrapolating revenue using a best-fit function, and then 
naively applying the 2019 net profit margin (10.3%) on the extrapolated revenue, it is 
possible to create a base scenario of net profit where business will continue, quite literally, 
as usual. The 2019 margin is used instead of its historical average, again simply because 
the profit data may not be internally consistent. This simplification could be more justified 
with Olvi than with more cyclical companies that experience greater fluctuation in their 
net profit margins. 
To extrapolate revenue data, the curve-fitting approach is used as described by Gor-
don (2009a, 3). The fit of seven different functions to the 2002-2019 revenue trend can 
be tested using Microsoft Excel’s built-in “Trendline” feature. This feature fits generic 
trendline functions to a given series of data, with the least-squares of fit (Microsoft 2020). 
49 
 
For each function, the feature finds a set of constant values that lead to the highest coef-
ficient of determination, R2, a number between 0 and 1 describing “how closely the esti-
mated values for the trendline correspond to […] actual data” (ibid). Table 2 shows a list 
of the types of trendlines and their equations. 
 
Table 2. Trendline types and their equations. Adapted from Microsoft (2020) 
 
Trendline  Equation 
Linear 
y = mx + b 
where m is the slope and b is the intercept. 
Logarithmic 
y = cln(x) + b 
where c and b are constants, and ln is the natural logarithm function. 
2nd order Polynomial 
y = b + c1x + c2x2 
where b , c1 and c2 are constants. 
3rd order Polynomial 
y = b + c1x + c2x2 + c3x3 
where b , c1 , c2 and c3 are constants. 
4th order Polynomial 
y = b + c1x + c2x2 + c3x3 + c4x4 
where b , c1 , c2 , c3 and c4 are constants. 
Power 
y = cxb 
where b and c are constants. 
Exponential 
y = cebx 
where c and b are constants and e is the base of the natural logarithm. 
 
To describe Olvi’s historical revenue data using the functions in Table 2, revenue can be 
assigned as dependent variable y, and years in the time series can be assigned as inde-
pendent variable x. Any function can then be extrapolated by substituting x with future 
years in the time series, though principally the one with the highest R2 should be chosen 
(Gordon 2009a, 2, 10). This kind of trend extrapolation is regularly done in finance, for 
economic benefit streams like profits or cash flows (Hitchner 2017, 132). As such, the 
way that TIA extrapolates the base scenario is not in any way a novel suggestion for a 
DDM or DCF context. According to Hitchner (ibid), extrapolation in this manner requires 
that historical data spans a period of five years or more, and that the data is directionally 
consistent. Both conditions are well satisfied with the data about Olvi. 
4.5 Survey 1 
Survey 1 is designed to obtain two important subjective estimations from the pool of 
participants: their return expectation for the Olvi stock and potentially impactful future 
phenomena to create the list of TIA statements. This survey is created using the Webropol 
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tool (Webropol 2020). A copy of the actual survey form (in Finnish) is available in Ap-
pendix 4. 
Questions 1 and 2 are “screening questions” in the beginning of the survey, used to 
confirm that the participants possess at least an elementary factual knowledge of the sub-
ject. The full survey responses of those participants who failed at least one of the screen-
ing questions are simply excluded from any further analysis. A minimal level of expertise 
is deemed important by Armstrong (1980, 16), and these screening questions attempt to 
confirm that participants qualify. The screening questions are aided recall questions, in 
the broad category of knowledge questions (Lavrakas 2011, 412), where participants are 
provided with multiple options about specific facts and are asked to choose the right op-
tion. Question 1 is about which set of geographical markets does Olvi operate in. Question 
2 is about the simple accounting definition of net profit. Both questions 1 and 2 are mul-
tiple choice questions. Answering them is not a difficult task if the participant has an 
elementary understanding of Olvi and the income statement. As a limitation, it must be 
also acknowledged that a participant might misbehave and look up the correct answers 
from public sources while filling in their response. They might also only get lucky and 
pick the right answer without knowing it. Still, the inclusion of these screening questions 
might filter out some participants who lack a passing knowledge of the subject. 
Question 3 is where the participants indicate what is their expected rate of return 
(annual average, excluding capital gains tax) for Olvi’s “class A” stock over the next 
decade. Return expectations may be used as the discount rate in a DDM, explained later 
in this section. This is expressed with a freely movable slider format with a range from -
25% to +25%, starting from 0 and with increments of one decimal point. It is not expected 
that a participant would truly want to indicate a higher or lower figure; an average return 
greater than 25% in either direction compounds to massive changes very quickly. 
Question 4 is an open request to write down one possible future phenomenon that the 
participants consider as potentially most impactful on Olvi’s net profit trend in the next 
decade. In this study, experts’ answers are used as the source for generating the TIA state-
ments, which is one of the options recommended by Gordon (2009a, 4). Question 4 is 
kept intentionally broad and open in that it is only about “phenomena”. There is no nar-
rowing down by any common futures studies categorization of phenomena like weak sig-
nals, trends, and megatrends, or a STEEP categorization, etc. The purpose is simply to 
ask for the one possibly impactful phenomenon that comes to the participants’ minds.  
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In survey 1, it is mandatory for participants to read and accept the disclaimer in the 
beginning (in Appendix 2), and to answer all four questions. The ending page contains a 
message explaining that there will be a second optional survey, which will partially be 
based on the answers collected in survey 1. 
4.6 Coding to TIA statements 
After survey 1 is finished, and before the process of making expert judgments of the 
probabilities and impacts can be started, a necessary step in between is crafting the list 
TIA statements. These will be created based on answers to question 4, described above. 
All answers cannot be used directly as originally submitted for two reasons. First, 
related to the TIA method in general, the TIA statements must fulfill criteria of plausibil-
ity, potential power, and verifiability. Second, even though there is no technical maximum 
limit to them, restricting the number of statements to only a few is necessary to manage 
the length of the second survey. Phenomena that have a similar theme are to be grouped 
together by any qualitative similarity by the author of this thesis. This is “coding” (Fisher 
2010, 199). Specific grouped phenomena mentioned the most times by participants will 
be reformulated into TIA statements. Only phenomena mentioned by more than one ex-
pert are considered. 
As a limitation, it is acknowledged that the author’s own interpretation and bias may 
greatly influence how answers are translated into TIA statements. Consequently, the 
wording of the TIA statements is going to influence the way that experts make their judg-
ments about them. According to the “support theory” in psychology by Koehler & 
Tversky (1994, 548-549), the wording and specific details mentioned in each TIA state-
ment could evoke memories, stereotypes or other mental processes that directly affect 
how experts will form their numeric judgments. Gordon (1992, 26) observed that “we 
tend to give higher probabilities to desired future events than undesired”. This is unavoid-
able, but it is recognized. 
4.7 Survey 2 
In survey 2, expert judgments of probability and impact are to be made about the TIA 
statements. Survey 2 is also created with the same Webropol tool as survey 1. A copy of 
the final survey form used (in Finnish) is available in Appendix 5. 
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The main design consideration is the required detail of data collection. The priority 
is to ensure that a few complete responses are received. This means the time and effort 
required from participants must be kept low; for master’s thesis projects, any survey 
should not be more than a few pages in length (Fisher 2010, 210). Therefore, it is sensible 
to collect the expert judgments following the lowest possible level of detail, shown in 
Gordon (2009a, 6), with three variables being a total probability, the level of maxi-
mum/steady-state impact, and time from the start of an event to its maximum/steady-state 
level, even though the TIA method would be capable of much more varying judgment 
inputs as well. 
As done before in survey 1, survey 2 also begins with two screening questions, to 
confirm if participants have minimal expertise in the subject area. Again, if one of the 
screening questions is not passed, participants’ further answers are excluded from further 
analysis. Question 1 is about Olvi’s product categories. Question 2 is about the range by 
which Olvi’s net profit fluctuates historically from year-to-year, with the options being 
0-1%, 10-50% or 100-200%. This is intentionally slightly more difficult than question 1. 
Answering correctly (10-50%) requires that participants grasp the order of magnitude of 
change that is normal for this variable. The ease of this task for any participant is assumed 
to be dependent on how many Olvi income statements the individual has studied in the 
past. It is important that participants can choose the correct answer, because it is directly 
related to the trend that they make judgments about in the remaining questions. 
For each TIA statement, there is a consistent one-page format, where the TIA state-
ment is presented without comment at the top of the page. There is a total of four questions 
on each of these pages. First, a “probability question” asks the participants’ subjective 
estimate of the probability of the statement happening before 2030 on a sliding interval 
scale from 0% to 100% with 1% increments. The extreme ends have precise verbal defi-
nitions (“impossible” and “certain”). Some degree of standardizing the meanings of lan-
guage is recommendable in projects that deal with numeric probabilities (Barnes 2016, 
335), and here at least the extreme ends are clearly defined. 
Second, in the “impact question”, participants must subjectively estimate the level of 
impact on Olvi’s net profit, at the point in time where it is at its highest – compared to if 
the event did not happen at all. This is asked on a freely sliding interval scale, with the 
range limited from -50% to +50%, again with 1% increments. It is assumed here that any 
single TIA statement will not cause an impact that continues at a level greater than +/-
50% every year: if a single phenomenon is to have a recurring annual impact greater than 
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50%, its compounding effect will be very dramatic very soon within the 10-year forecast 
period. It should be noted that the participants are not actually shown a projection of the 
net profit trend here. The intention is not to predict absolute figures, but to collect esti-
mations of the rough scale of profit impact. 
Third, a “time until maximum impact question” is about defining how many years 
would it take for the level of maximum impact to be reached. The wording of this question 
refers directly to the answer that participants give to the previous question. This is also a 
sliding interval scale with 11 steps, ranging from 0 years (immediate) and up to 10 years 
(and beyond), with increments of 1 year. 
Fourth, there is also an open-ended optional comment box for participants to explain 
in free writing what kind of rationale do they base their probability and impact judgments 
on. Such information is not the focus, but may be interesting supplementary information 
for understanding how the task of estimating probability and impact is approached or 
perceived. There is also an “I don’t know” option for all of the four questions. By choos-
ing this, participants can effectively skip a question. This is again included to increase the 
response rate. It is expected to lead to some incomplete survey answers, which is accepta-
ble. 
4.8 TIA simulation 
After survey 2, all the necessary expert judgments to perform TIA will be available, but 
they will need to be aggregated in a format that can be used as inputs in TIA. The two 
categories of aggregation defined in the literature review are behavioral and mathemati-
cal. As the information is collected in a manner where experts respond individually, be-
havioral aggregation is not possible. In terms of mathematical aggregation approaches, 
Hanea et al. (2018, 1783) remark that simple equal-weighting using an arithmetic mean 
outperforms most of the other, more complicated, aggregation methods in judgment ac-
curacy. The only clearly better option would be weighting based on the participants’ track 
record in similar forecasting tasks (ibid), but it is not possible in the scope of this project, 
and therefore using an average to aggregate the probability and impact judgments is jus-
tified. 
After the aggregation of answers to the probability question, it still needs to be de-
termined what would be the implied probability of a TIA statement happening in any 
individual year in the forecast period. This may be found from the total probability of a 
statement happening before 2030, with a simple application of the binomial distribution 
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(Jaynes 2003, 70). The objective is to represent the inverse of a TIA statement not hap-
pening in any given year, with an independent “Bernoulli trial” (ibid, 164) in each year. 
It is assumed that a TIA statement either happens, or does not happen, in any given year. 
This is expressed in equation (2). 
 
 𝑝 = 1 − (1 − 𝑃)(
1
𝑇
)
, (2) 
 
where p is the probability in any single given year before 2030, P is its total probability 
before 2030, T is the number of years before 2030. P is the aggregate expert judgment for 
each TIA statement. T is, in this case, equal to 10.  
If the probability of a TIA statement comes true in any time period, then the TIA 
simulation must begin applying some level of impact on the base scenario from that point 
on. For this purpose, the participants’ judgments of impact, and the time to maximum 
impact, are also aggregated with the equal-weighted mean. The impact curves of each 
TIA statement can be drawn with the simplest possible shape described by Gordon 
(2009a) where the maximum impact level is reached gradually, following a linear increase 
that lasts until the time until maximum impact is finished. After this, the impact level 
stays at a constant maximum/steady-state level.  
After expert judgments are aggregated, it is possible to perform the simulation. This 
is to be done by directly replicating the steps outlined by Gordon (2009a), and practically 
performed in Microsoft Excel using a custom spreadsheet. How each cell in the spread-
sheet is coded is not explained here, but importantly, the “RAND” function serves as the 
generator of random numbers between 0 and 1 and the “IF” statement handles all of the 
logical “decisions” involved in the process. 
The simulation is individually repeated 10,000 times, in the Monte Carlo manner. 
The total number 10,000 is chosen somewhat arbitrarily, but with two practical reasons 
in mind. First, it makes intuitive sense to use a multiplier of 10 for the purpose of inter-
preting the results. Second, because there is no real unit cost associated with running more 
Monte Carlo simulations than less, it is logical to choose a higher number than 100 (Dam-
odaran 2018, 24). This could be interpreted analogously to increasing the sample size in 
data collection. The 10,000 runs are done by applying a very simple macro program which 
creates one new scenario, copies and pastes it to another sheet containing the database of 
created scenarios, moves to the next row in this database sheet, returns to the first sheet, 
and repeats itself 10,000 times. The complete information that is saved includes details 
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of which TIA statements caused how much impact and when. This enables comparisons 
of the different PMT scenarios at the highest possible level of detail. 
The summary of all 10,000 scenarios can be presented following Gordon (2009a, 5), 
by directly observing measures of variability and the arithmetic mean from the simulated 
data. These summary scenarios are called “main scenarios” in this work. They include 
the minimum, maximum, first quartile, median, third quartile and the mean. The unmod-
ified base scenario by itself is to be presented with the six main scenarios, to understand 
what the TIA statements contribute to the base scenario.   
The exact process of defining these main scenarios is that values are observed directly 
and separately at the level of individual years, from the database of all 10,000 scenarios. 
To give an example, a “minimum scenario” can be compiled by finding the lowest simu-
lated value in 2020 across all simulations, followed by finding the lowest value in 2021, 
moving through every year in that manner, and constructing a series of minimum values 
from those observations. Thus, a minimum scenario represents the individually identified 
lowest values across all scenarios, compiled together in one sequence. That logic applies 
to how all of the other scenarios named after measures of variability are defined. 
A “mean scenario” has a slight difference to the others, because it is compiled from 
the arithmetic mean of values in every year. Thus, a mean scenario can end up containing 
values that are not direct observations of actually simulated values, but are their averages. 
Therefore, a mean scenario is a result of a probability-impact weighting process, and in 
that way may be the closest thing to an “expected value” that TIA can offer. The mean is 
not always included in TIA; often just a median scenario is shown as a measure of central 
tendency (Gordon 2009a, 5). 
4.9 DDM inputs 
The main scenarios that summarize the results of TIA (range, quartiles, mean) are to be 
valued using a DDM. Valuation is not done separately for each of the individual 10,000 
PMT scenarios, because their information is already captured in the main scenarios.  
DDMs are the simplest possible type of a DCF. Williams (1938, 55) argued that the 
value of a firm is based only on the future dividends paid out to shareholders. Dividends 
are merely a subset of complete cash flow, but are favored especially by traditional value 
investors, because they are practically “the only cash flow from the firm that is tangible 
to investors” (Damodaran 2006, 169). Thus, DDMs are the most conservative, compared 
to more advanced DCF methods. In other words, valuation results may be less susceptible 
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to being overly high. Graham (1939, 278) expressed strong support for valuing stocks 
with DDMs, specifically citing conservativism as the key reason. This is especially nota-
ble in the context that Graham & Dodd’s (1951, 17) “margin of safety” philosophy is 
generally mostly against making financial projections. 
On the other hand, the main weakness of a DDM has also to do with its conservative 
nature. Damodaran (2006, 654) suggests that DDMs are almost always less realistic than 
FCFE models. This is because a sole focus on dividends leaves out a number of other 
items that do create shareholder value. As a simple example, the possibility of share buy-
backs – an activity that Olvi has sometimes engaged in – is not considered in a DDM, 
even though buybacks are effectively similar to dividend payouts (as the act of reducing 
the number of shares outstanding directly increases the value of each remaining share).  
Still, a DDM can be an appropriate choice of tool for valuing Olvi, because the busi-
ness is characterized by slow change, a lack of cyclicality, and consistently high returns. 
Mauboussin (2007, 156) and Klarman (1991, 135) consider a DDM particularly suitable 
for analyzing businesses that possess those properties. The specific equation (3) used here 
is a multi-stage dividend discount formula, adapted from Damodaran (2006, 161). 
 
 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 =
𝐷𝑃𝑆1
(1 + 𝑘)1
+
𝐷𝑃𝑆2
(1 + 𝑘)2
+ ⋯
𝐷𝑃𝑆10
(1 + 𝑘)10
+
𝐷𝑃𝑆10(1 + 𝑔)
(𝑘 − 𝑔)(1 + 𝑘)10
 
 
, 
(3) 
 
where DPSt  is the expected dividends per share in year t, k is the discount rate, and g is 
the terminal growth rate. A separation to multiple periods is normally done to allow using 
different growth rates and discount rates. In this project, the reason for multiple periods 
is simply to clearly differentiate the individual years of the TIA forecast period (2020-
2029) from the terminal period, because a TIA has to end at a defined point. 
Here, to find the dividend from the TIA net profit output, it is assumed that there is 
a constant dependent relationship between profits and dividends. The measure of this re-
lationship is called the “payout ratio”, which may be defined as dividends paid out in one 
year, divided by the net profit in the preceding year (Merriam-Webster 2020). Olvi ap-
pears to manage its dividends by following a target payout ratio, using the above defini-
tion. The openly communicated long-term policy of the company is to keep a payout ratio 
of 40-60% (Olvi Group 2020a, 10). By studying the available annual reports, summarized 
in Appendix 3, the arithmetic mean payout ratio from 2003-2019 is found to be ~52% 
(though the median is ~45%). In this project, it is assumed that 50% is a reasonable, stable 
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payout ratio that Olvi can sustain in the future: 50% is at the middle of the range in Olvi’s 
dividend policy, and is also slightly below the historical average. As a limitation, it needs 
to be acknowledged that such translations of net profits to dividends can be erroneous 
(Pratt & Grabowski 2014, 163). 
It must also be noted that Olvi’s regular practice of paying dividends from the previ-
ous year’s profits means that the TIA output, the simulated net profit in any year, is con-
nected to the DPS for the next year. This means that while the forecast period of the TIA 
is years 2020-2029, the corresponding dividends in the DDM would be paid to sharehold-
ers in 2021-2030. Using the 50% payout ratio assumption, to find the DPSt for any year 
in a scenario, the total dividend payout in any year t is divided by the number of shares 
outstanding. There is a total of 20,722,232 shares, including both “class A” and “class 
K”. (Olvi Group 2020a, 4). Even though it is “class A” that is analyzed, the total dividend 
per share should be calculated on the basis of both classes, due to their dividend equiva-
lence – despite the fact that the “class K” shares are not publicly traded, they still exist, 
and must be accounted for. This is expressed in equation (4). 
 
 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑡 =  
(𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡(𝑡−1) ∗ 0.5)
20722232
 
 
, 
(4) 
 
where DPSt is the dividend per share in year t, and Net profit is the simulated value from 
TIA. 
As for discount rate k in equation (3), the “hurdle rate” approach is used by asking 
participants about their return expectation. k is the average of the answers to question 3 
in survey 1. Notably, the discount rate is the only variable of the DDM that is intended to 
stay constant across all scenarios, as its purpose is to be a standard “yardstick” that all 
scenarios are valued with. By using a rate provided by the participant pool, the valuation 
in a sense can become a mirror that reflects their expectations about the future. 
For comparison purposes with a cost of equity approach, the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM) is used to calculate an alternative rate, simply because of its widespread 
commonality in academic finance for estimating cost of equity. The classic CAPM for-
mula is available in many sources, including Hundal et al. (2019, 9), in equation (5). 
 
 𝐸[𝑅𝑖]  = 𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖(𝐸[𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓]), (5) 
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where E[Ri] is the expected return of the investment, Rf  is the risk-free rate, βi is the beta 
of the investment, and (E[Rm-Rf]) is the market equity risk premium. The risk-free rate Rf 
measures the virtually risk-free yield available on the financial markets, which practically 
exists in the form of government bonds (Hundal et al. 2019, 3). Beta βi is the covariance 
of an asset with a market portfolio divided by the variance of the market portfolio, meas-
ured over some historical time frame, and is intended to describe the risk (volatility) that 
the asset would add to a diversified portfolio (Damodaran 2006, 32). The market risk 
premium is the “extra return that would be demanded by investors for shifting their money 
from a riskless investment to an average-risk investment” (ibid, 37-38), and can be meas-
ured in equation (5) by a historical average return of stocks Rm less the risk-free return Rf 
(ibid). Other methods also do exist for its definition. In addition to CAPM, for another 
comparison discount rate, the historical return of Finnish equities as a whole can be used. 
Growth in the terminal period g in the DDM is estimated by applying the geometric 
average growth rate, commonly called the compound average growth rate (“CAGR”), of 
the DPS from the beginning of the forecast period until the end, shown in equation (6). 
 
 𝑔 = (
𝐷𝑃𝑆10
𝐷𝑃𝑆1
)(
1
10
) − 1 
 
, 
(6) 
 
In other words, it is assumed that the implied average annual growth rate of net profit and 
dividends during the forecast period will also continue indefinitely afterwards. Addition-
ally, a quick analysis of the coherency of results may be done by comparing g against 
historical GDP growth. It is acknowledged that the approach in equation (6) is clearly an 
imperfect assumption. It is debatable to what extent the terminal growth rate should really 
be connected to how a business grows in the preceding ten years. Though it is intuitive 
for there to be some linkage, it can also be better to assume that there is no connection at 
all, in light of research such as Little (1962). Furthermore, it is not necessarily obvious to 
what degree the terminal growth rate should vary across the different TIA scenarios. Here, 
the approach is to calculate g for each scenario individually, but it can also be that the rate 
from the base scenario or the median should be applied to every scenario, as a constant. 
The approach here is a compromise, and there may well exist a better way to handle this. 
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5 RESULTS 
5.1 Overview 
This section presents and discusses data that is collected and simulated, and what inter-
pretations are made of them. It is vital to note that the previous section should be read 
first to understand the methods and some concepts in this section. Answers to research 
questions 3 and 4 should emerge from results discussed in this section. 
The base scenario is created with historical income sheet data. Survey 1 collects ex-
pert opinions on subjective discount rates and impactful future phenomena. Phenomena 
are coded to group them together, and recurring phenomena are written into TIA state-
ments. In survey 2, experts give their judgments of probability and impact for the TIA 
statements. A simulation of 10,000 PMT scenarios is done by combining expert judg-
ments about TIA statements with the base scenario. Finally, by processing the main sce-
narios through the DDM, a valuation range for the Olvi “class A” share is found, and 
implications and a comparison to the share price are discussed.  
5.2 Base scenario 
To create the TIA base scenario for the net profit trend, it was explained in the previous 
section that in order to use a trend that has a more or less constant historical definition, 
the primary basis for extrapolation used here is actually Olvi’s revenue. After a function 
with the best fit is identified and a revenue extrapolation is made using it, future net profit 
could be assumed naively by applying the 2019 net margin (10.3%) on the extrapolated 
revenue, which forms the base scenario. 
For this curve-fitting, the Excel Trendline feature is used to define seven functions, 
listed in Table 2. The inputs for variables y and x are based on Olvi’s historical revenue 
data, in Appendix 3. y is a revenue figure in M € and x is a year in the data, starting from 
1 at 2002, which is the first year in the sequence. Functions found are ordered by their 
coefficient of determination R2 to the historical data in Table 3. 
  
60 
 
Table 3. Fit of trendline functions to revenue data from 2002-2019. 
 
Trendline type Equation R2 
4th order polynomial y = 26.997x4 - 1015.8x3 + 12110x2 - 30875x + 133599 0.992 
3rd order polynomial y = 10.035x3 - 659.13x2 + 26574x + 65890 0.972 
2nd order polynomial y = -373.15x2 + 24341x + 69894 0.972 
Linear y = 17252x + 93527 0.962 
Power y = 84987x0.5106 0.944 
Exponential y = 116376e0.0756x 0.917 
Logarithmic y = 110135ln(x) + 34727 0.885 
where y is a revenue figure in M €, x is a year in the time series, ln is the natural logarithm function, e is 
the base of the natural logarithm. 
 
As observed from Table 3, especially the polynomial functions seem to have a high fit to 
Olvi’s revenue history. However, Gordon (2009a, 3) has remarked that selecting the func-
tion that is used to create the extrapolation is not always as easy as picking the one that 
has the highest coefficient of determination: 
 
“Selection of the proper general curve shape can be difficult. Two different curve shapes, 
for example, can each fit the historical data well and yet produce markedly different ex-
trapolations.” (ibid) 
 
Therefore, a closer comparison of the extrapolations produced by the functions in Table 
3 should be done. Extrapolations to the end of the forecast period in 2029 for all functions 
in Table 3 are achieved by simply substituting variable x with future years in the time 
series, beginning from 19 at 2020, due to it being the 19th year in the whole time series. 
Figure 4 demonstrates how radically varying the extrapolated results of all functions are. 
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Figure 4. Extrapolation of all functions from Table 3. 
 
As seen in Figure 4, the 4th order polynomial and the exponential functions lead to orders 
of magnitude more aggressive extrapolations than the rest. Despite the fact that the 4th 
order polynomial has the highest R2 value, it should probably not be chosen, because the 
extrapolation violates all common sense. The annual growth rate would constantly be in 
the double-digits, with revenue in 2029 being greater than 3.1 bn €, which does not at all 
fit Olvi’s profile of a stable and established consumer goods business. Thus, it is judged 
here on qualitative grounds that an intervention is required. The 4th order polynomial 
function and the exponential function are disqualified from further consideration. Figure 
5 excludes them, and shows the other functions, using a closer scale. 
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Figure 5. Extrapolation of selected functions from Table 3. 
 
All the remaining extrapolations in Figure 5 represent much more plausible growth pro-
jections than the two that were excluded. The 3rd degree polynomial has the best fit of 
these options. Even still, the choice could be debated. The 2nd order polynomial has a 
virtually identical R2, yet would lead to a much lower final result than the 3rd order pol-
ynomial. The linear function also seems to have a good fit but would lead to the highest 
growth. However, because there are no more functions that literally go “off the chart” 
among these options, by following the logic of Gordon (2009a), it seems the default 
choice should probably be the 3rd order polynomial, simply due to its highest fit. There-
fore, it is chosen. The 2019 net margin of 10.3% is applied on that extrapolated revenue 
to arrive at a base scenario of net profit, shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Base scenario. 
Revenue (right vertical axis) is visually scaled down by 10x in relation to net profit (left vertical axis). 
 
The base scenario in Figure 6 is not necessarily accurate. Most strikingly, the simple ex-
trapolation cannot incorporate annual fluctuation to its result; occasionally there are 
weaker years for business, where revenue or net profit do decrease from the previous year. 
The clear exception is the small drop-off from 2019 to 2020, which is caused by the fact 
that this is the point where the 3rd degree polynomial takes over from historical data. 
Another observation is that overall growth would meaningfully slow down from the early 
2000’s: the CAGR of net profit during the ‘20-’29 period would be just 2.49%, using 
equation (6). It needs to be also noted that the net profit margin has only been greater than 
10% since 2016, and could very well revert back to single digits in the future. 
Despite a high likelihood of the base scenario being inaccurate, it is not unbelievable 
either. The implied slowing down of growth makes assumptions conservative, which is 
not necessarily bad in an investing context, fitting a value investing framework. Further-
more, the purpose must be repeated here: the base scenario in TIA is a simple extrapola-
tion, nothing more.  
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5.3 Survey responses overview 
Both surveys 1 and 2 were published in May 2020 on the Olvi page of the Shareville 
social media network. Each survey was made available for a week: survey 1 was live 
from 6 May to 13 May, and survey 2 from 15 May to 22 May. In survey 1, 19 out of 21 
participants (90%) passed the screening questions. Later, in survey 2, 15 out of 31 at-
tempting participants (48%) passed the screening questions. The lower passing rate may 
be due to the higher relative difficulty of the question about the fluctuation of Olvi’s net 
profit, compared to the rest of the questions. The responses of those participants who did 
not pass the screening questions are not analyzed any further, nor are they included in the 
relevant Appendices 6 & 7 which include only accepted responses. 
Before discussing the responses in detail, there are two important general remarks to 
be made about them. First, the response rates are so low that the results definitely do not 
represent the whole population of Finnish retail investors following the Olvi business, by 
any statistical measure. Therefore, any results are taken to only describe the opinions of 
these unidentifiable participants. However, the purpose of the TIA method is to express 
the subjective probabilities of a small group of experts. As such, the low survey sample 
size does not invalidate the use of TIA, but it must be recognized that there is no way to 
conclude anything about the broader retail investor community that follows Olvi. Second, 
as the emphasis is on maintaining the full anonymity of participants, there is no control 
that participants to each survey would be the same. It is plausible that there is a high 
degree of overlap, as the relevant Shareville website may be frequented by the same peo-
ple. But the subjective expected rates of return in survey 1 are not actually what the spe-
cific participants to survey 2 expect.  
5.4 Return expectation 
The participants’ average return expectation is here compared against the two “bench-
mark” comparison discount rates: a cost of equity computed using the CAPM, and a his-
torical total return of Finnish equities. The full responses to survey 1 are in Appendix 6. 
Figure 7 visualizes the participants’ return expectation against the comparison rates. 
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Figure 7. Participants’ return expectation for Olvi and comparison rates. 
 
Just one participant has a negative return expectation of -10%. To use stock market jar-
gon, this is a very “bearish” view on the stock. In a decade, an investment with a -10% 
annual return would retain about a third of its original value. It implies that something 
catastrophic should happen to Olvi. On the other end, the highest expectation is +18%, 
implying that an investment would grow by more than fourfold. The general lack of neg-
ative expectations could be explained by a selection bias: because the participants are 
followers of the stock, they may be already predisposed towards taking a “long” position 
in it, and at least some if not most participants are likely to be shareholders. 
However, the average response of 5.52% (practically identical to the median, 5.50%) 
is not very high. It is actually below historical equity market returns. The first comparison 
discount rate, the historical total return of Finnish equities, is as high as 10.03% from 
1870-2015 (Jordà et al. 2019, 22). The participants’ average expectation is modest in 
comparison to this. The second comparison, CAPM, is calculated using equation (5). In-
puts for Olvi are found and applied in equation (7). 
 
 𝐸[𝑅𝑖] =  0% + 0.30(10.03% − (0%)) =  3.00%, (7) 
 
Currently, in the whole Euro area, including Finland, government bond yields are nega-
tive (European Central Bank 2020). This means that investors will “lock in” a loss by 
buying bonds, paying governments to hold their money for ten years. However, in 
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practice it is not unreasonable to assume that investors, including institutional investors, 
can store their cash somewhere for a risk-free 0% interest rate, which is used equation 
(7). For the historical market return, the 10.03% figure from Jordà et al. (2019) is used. 
For the beta input, Olvi’s 5-year beta measure (0.30) is retrieved from Morningstar 
(2020a) on 30 July 2020. Because the beta is less than 1, the stock price statistically moves 
much less than the market, and consequently makes any investment in Olvi less “risky” 
in CAPM and related risk-reward models. The resulting cost of equity of 3.00% is a re-
markably low discount rate for a stock and is bound to lead in relatively optimistic valu-
ations. The result would be even lower if a negative bond yield was utilized in the CAPM, 
instead of the 0% substitution. 
5.5 Three TIA statements 
This section describes the types of future phenomena from responses to question 4 in 
survey 1, and three TIA statements that are created from them. The full responses are 
available in Appendix 6, which also shows their coding to various categories. Evaluated 
qualitatively, most of the ideas given by participants might fall in the realm of the “plau-
sible” futures. They may be unlikely and counterintuitive but could conceivably become 
true, because they seem more dependent on large-scale social trends rather than physical 
boundaries. Perhaps the single most imaginative response suggests some unknown radi-
cally new product category that “achieves global popularity”, also saying that it would be 
an unlikely but possible event. 
Despite the fact that question 4 in survey 1 is worded neutrally, the overall tone and 
connotation of the responses appears negative – only one response mentions a phenome-
non that is presented in very clear positive terms for Olvi’s business (a specific type of 
product becoming an “international hit”). It appears that highly impactful future phenom-
ena are perceived by participants more as threats and risks, rather than opportunities. It is 
not clear if this is a coincidence, or if there is an explanation. Reasons might be perhaps 
related either to the presentation (wording) of the original question in the context of the 
full survey 1, or some shared characteristic in the participant group. 
Most responses are extremely specific and have no common thematic ground with 
the others. However, three categories barely emerge and are turned to TIA statements, 
which is enough for a basic simulation. Three is also the lowest applied number of TIA 
statements that has been observed in another real application of TIA, by Hennen & Ben-
ninga (2009, 19). The summary of the TIA statements is presented in Table 4. 
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Table 4. TIA statements created by coding of mentioned phenomena. 
 
# 
Category of 
phenomena 
Count of 
mentions 
Full TIA statement created 
1 
Healthy 
Lifestyles 
4 
”Consumers focus more on healthy lifestyles, and as a 
consequence, total consumption of alcohol lowers by 2 li-
tres per capita in each of Olvi’s markets.” 
2 Online Sales 2 
”New legal changes are introduced in Olvi’s markets con-
cerning the online sales of alcohol. Because of this, online 
sales and home delivery are as easy as with any other 
consumer product. " 
3 Excise Tax 2 
”Taxation of alcohol in each of Olvi’s markets rises to lev-
els comparable to Finland (taking into account general 
economic differences between countries)." 
- Others 5 - 
- No Answer 5 - 
 
TIA statement 1 is based on the “Healthy Lifestyles” category of responses, which is the 
most frequent. There is an attempt to quantify the statement, to include an element of 
verifiability to it. A 2-litre decline in alcohol consumption would be historically signifi-
cant. For example, in Finland, this would be approximately a 20% decline from present 
levels (Terveyden ja hyvinvoinnin laitos 2020), though it would be relatively lower in 
countries with higher consumption like Belarus. Such a large decline resulting from 
healthier consumer lifestyle choices appears unlikely but still plausible. 
TIA statement 2, “Online Sales”, is a combination of two answers that mentioned an 
increase in the online sales of alcohol products. Currently, legal frameworks for this are 
not necessarily clearly defined or uniform on national levels and between countries, and 
that element is incorporated within the full text of the statement. The Internet could be an 
entirely new future sales channel for Olvi, but it is not obvious how this would affect the 
business.  
TIA statement 3 “Excise Tax” is made from those two responses that mention alcohol 
excise taxation as the most potentially significant future phenomenon. In particular, a 
response specifies tax increases in Belarus and Estonia. This angle is carried over to the 
full TIA statement, using Finland as a point of comparison, which might help the Finnish 
participants when they evaluate the statement. Excise taxes on alcohol are relatively low 
in Eastern European countries (including a few of Olvi’s main markets) and higher in 
Finland (Angus et al. 2019). 
Overall, responses are mostly related to Olvi’s end markets, the products, and factors 
impacting demand. The responses do not mention factors that are “invisible” to 
68 
 
consumers, such as production operations, research & development activities, supply 
chains etc. Notably, the participants’ focus is more on alcohol, rather than the other prod-
uct categories that Olvi manufactures – however, this may be also entirely justified, con-
sidering that mild alcohol products seem to be the core of the product lineup. It is inter-
esting to compare the responses received to the perceptions of the management of Olvi 
itself. At least an indication of what the company itself considers as future risks can be 
found in the (legally required) “Operational Risks” section in the latest annual report: 
 
“The Group’s most substantial identified operational risks relate to the procurement and 
quality of raw materials and packaging supplies, the production process, markets and cus-
tomers, personnel, information security and systems, as well as changes in foreign ex-
change rates, the environment as well as actions in violation of ethical values.“ (Olvi 
Group 2020a, 15). 
 
The participants’ responses mainly relate to the “markets and customers” category in the 
above quote, and do not have overlap with the rest of the risks disclosed by the company. 
There do not appear to be any public comments from the company with regard to the 
Healthy Lifestyles statement or the Online Sales statement, but for the Excise Tax state-
ment, it is clear that Olvi does consider excise taxation one very significant factor that has 
recently had meaningful impacts in Estonia and Latvia, affecting the real demand of their 
products and net profit (Olvi Group 2020a, 1, 16). 
Also, only one participant response directly mentions the global COVID-19 pan-
demic ongoing at the time. On some level this may be surprising, as it could be logical to 
classify the pandemic as an impactful phenomenon: at the time of survey 1, Olvi had 
already withdrawn its 2020 profit guidance as a direct consequence (Olvi Group 2020d). 
However, a reasonable explanation for why more participants do not mention it is that the 
pandemic might be perceived to be only a short-term issue – after all, question 4 is about 
the entire next decade.  
No categories can be assigned for a total of five responses, three of them indicating 
that participants are unable to respond at all, even though the question is mandatory to 
answer. In that light, a “I don’t know” option would have been useful to include here. 
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5.5.1 Probability judgments 
This section summarizes the responses to the probability questions posed about each TIA 
statement. The full results are in Appendix 7. A summary of the responses is shown in 
Figure 8. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Summary of probability judgments. 
 
The Healthy Lifestyles and Online Sales statements are judged to be quite likely on aver-
age. Still, averages for both are below 50%, suggesting that the independent statements 
would not come true “most of the time”. By contrast, the Excise Tax statement is seen as 
much less likely as the other two. It is the only statement where two participants go as far 
as judging it entirely impossible (0%). For each statement, and for any individual year 
before 2030, probabilities are found applying equation (2), and calculation results are 
summarized in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Subjective probability of TIA statements in any one year. 
 Aggregate probability judgment (%) 
# TIA statement Before 2030 In any one year 
1 Healthy Lifestyles 48.5% 6.4% 
2 Online Sales 45.7% 5.9% 
3 Excise Tax 15.2% 1.6% 
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It seems that while the occurrence of one or more TIA statements may be expected over 
the whole forecast period, at the level of individual years, the occurrence of any statement 
may be unlikely, due to their single-digit probabilities. 
5.5.2 Impact curves 
The aggregate results to the “maximum impact” and “time until maximum impact” ques-
tions in survey 2 are combined together, in order to define impact curves. To repeat, the 
impact curves can “begin” at any time period in a simulated scenario, but only at the point 
when the relevant TIA statement occurs for the first time, as its probability comes true. 
Original responses are in Appendix 7. Figure 9 shows the resulting curves compared with 
each other. 
 
Figure 9. Impact curves of TIA statements. 
 
The Healthy Lifestyles statement is judged as moderately negative, with the impact real-
izing itself slowly over four years. It implies Olvi would still manage as a beverage com-
pany in a world with lower alcohol consumption. However, several individual responses 
evaluate this as a positive trend for the company. That would perhaps imply growth in 
other product categories than alcoholic beverages, with these products being either more 
profitable than alcohol, or selling at a much higher volume than before. 
The Online Sales statement is the only one that is judged in positive terms on average. 
This statement is also clearly perceived to be very difficult to evaluate, as six participants 
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chose the “I don’t know option”. Two participants estimate the impact would be negative, 
which also seems very plausible; for example, the online sales channel would be new to 
Olvi and could “cannibalize” sales from Olvi’s currently existing grocery stores channel.   
The Excise Tax statement is assigned the role of a very damaging threat, with the 
highest negative impact and the fastest time until the maximum impact level is reached. 
There is a quite clear consensus about the negative direction of the impact. A bizarre 
exception is that one participant assumes a positive annual impact of +48%. It would be 
interesting to understand the rationale for that answer – it may be a mistake. 
As an overall remark about the impact responses, the range of responses received is 
very large. There is no clear consensus about them, as there exists disagreement about the 
direction of impacts. This may be beneficial, not detrimental, as diversity between indi-
vidual judgments may increase the accuracy of their aggregate (Tetlock & Gardner, 134). 
Still, even though it is not possible in the scope of this thesis, it would be valuable to get 
further inputs from participants to understand reasons behind the very heterogenous judg-
ments.  
5.5.3 Rationale for judgments 
Only a single response is received to the optional question where participants could freely 
explain the rationale for their judgments. This response is related to the Healthy Lifestyles 
statement. The comment explains that answering the question is not possible due to per-
ceived uncertainties related to the demand and nature of possible substitute products for 
alcoholic drinks. Nothing can be concluded from this one response. 
5.6 10,000 PMT scenarios 
This section explains the result of the TIA simulation. The simulation synthesizes the 
base scenario with the three TIA statements and the aggregated expert judgments of prob-
ability and impact. The 10,000 PMT scenarios are summarized as the minimum, first 
quartile (“Q1”), mean, median, third quartile (“Q3”) and maximum. The numeric values 
of these are in Appendix 8. The scenarios are visualized in Figure 10. It should be noted 
that the base scenario and median are fully identical, which is why those two are shown 
as one line. 
72 
 
 
Figure 10. 10,000 PMT scenarios of net profit. 
 
The overall message that Figure 10 seems to deliver is that while the TIA statements do 
illustrate a wide range of possible outcomes, their expected impact on Olvi’s net profit is 
not very significant – they would probably lead to an almost identical result to the base 
scenario by itself. Across the whole forecast period, the mean scenario is only marginally 
lower than the median/base scenario, which is seen in the extremely narrow visual gap 
between the two in Figure 10. At the same time, there is still a real possibility of some 
impact. The range of outcomes appears slightly asymmetric, with higher potential effects 
to the downside than the upside. Another main observation is that any impacts of the TIA 
statements would probably only begin to be notable in 2024, not sooner, as the year 2024 
is when the first quartile (“Q1”) and third quartile (“Q3”) start to diverge from the median. 
As for the median scenario, it is 100% identical to the base scenario, meaning that 
the median is completely unaffected by TIA statements. This is perhaps counterintuitive. 
A total of 2374 complete scenarios have values identical to the median result, representing 
23.7% of all scenarios. Though not visualized in Figure 10, the mode (most common 
value) would also be identical to the median. Logically there must be a ~76.3% total 
probability (1 - 0.237) that at least one of the TIA statements does occur at some point in 
the simulation. In fact, the same result can also be inferred just from the summary of 
probabilities in Table 5. However, when observing individual years, the probabilities of 
all three TIA statements are quite low, in the single digits. Because these main scenarios 
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are constructed on the level of individual years, consequently, the median scenario shows 
no impact at all.  
The Q1 and Q3 scenarios convey useful information when observed in relation to the 
median. Half of all scenarios fall in the interquartile range, between the first and third 
quartiles. It appears that if there is any divergence from the base scenario, this would only 
happen beginning in 2024. This may be a result of the expert judgments of time until 
maximum impact: the full impacts of TIA statements are reached gradually, only after a 
few years have passed from the beginning of a TIA statement. By only looking at the 
ending value in 2029, and comparing where the Q1 and Q3 scenarios end relative to the 
median, it is worth noting that Q3 is only 2.5% above the median, while Q1 is 7.4% lower. 
The net effect of the TIA statements tends to be unfavorable. The negative impacts of the 
Healthy Lifestyles and Excise Tax statements are overall judged to have higher probabil-
ities of being realized than the positive Online Sales statement. 
The maximum scenario represents the positive extreme of outcomes. The observed 
frequency of the maximum scenario is 264, which represents just 2.6% of all simulations 
– it represents an unlikely sequence of events. Here, the “bad” TIA statements do not 
happen at all and the only “good” TIA statement (Online Sales) is triggered immediately 
in 2020. This sequence of events would lead to substantially higher net profits compared 
to most scenarios, and it is visible in how the maximum is visually much higher than the 
Q3 scenario in Figure 11. The Q3 scenario being notably below the maximum reflects 
that in 75% of simulations, the maximum scenario is far from reach. 
Conversely, the minimum scenario is characterized by the “bad” TIA statements 
(Healthy Lifestyles and Excise Tax) being triggered immediately. Of course, the positive 
effect of the Online Sales statement never occurs. In the minimum scenario, Olvi’s net 
profit first declines, and then slowly reaches the 2020 level again only in 2025. Because 
the minimum scenario is entirely conditional on two specific low-probability events hap-
pening at once during the first time period, there were only 5 simulated instances of it, 
0.05% of all 10,000. Meanwhile, the less extreme scenarios around the Q1 tend to be 
affected by just one of the negative statements, and/or one of them beginning after the 
other has already begun. While the minimum scenario itself is extremely rare, Figure 10 
shows that there is a large visual distance between the minimum and Q1, an area of neg-
ative events happening, where many scenarios are practically almost as “bad” as the min-
imum. 
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In an investing context, it can be preferable that the three TIA statements do not have 
a dramatic impact on the mean scenario. All else being equal, less uncertainty can be 
better. The relative unimportance of the statements on the median and mean scenarios 
seems to be fully in line with the supposition that Olvi is a stable, simple and slowly 
changing business. Still, it must be remembered that only three statements are included: 
if the same experts were to make judgments about more TIA statements, there almost 
certainly would exist some that would lead to larger impacts, and a shifting in the central 
tendency. Due to the low number of statements, perhaps the full benefits of the TIA 
method are not realized here, though it is a deeper analysis than the base scenario by itself. 
5.7 DDM valuation of scenarios 
Here, the main PMT scenarios are processed through the DDM in equation (3), to find a 
present value in each. Dividends per share DPS come from simulated net profit using 
equation (4). Discount rate k is the participants’ average return expectation 5.52%. Ter-
minal growth rate g is found for each scenario using equation (6). Valuation results are 
also compared against the closing price of the “class A” share on 30 July 2020, from 
Morningstar (2020a). The valuation range is displayed in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11. DDM valuation of main scenarios. 
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A logical way to interpret the results is to consider in which scenarios is the Olvi share 
undervalued, and what sequences of events would need to happen for them to become 
true. The stock might represent an attractive buying opportunity especially if the share 
price was significantly below the mean scenario, which has the role of an expected value. 
But that is far from the case here, as the current share price 41.50€ happens to be 26.9% 
above the mean scenario at 32.70€.  
No trading action would be recommendable. However, that does not mean that the 
valuation has “failed”. Generally, the expected final outcome of analyzing alternative in-
vestment options probably should be that most are not “buys”. In a broad sense, futures 
studies aims to provide guidance for present action (Bell 1997, 89) but here it appears that 
the best action could be inaction. That in itself is a valid finding. 
The exception is the maximum scenario at 43.23€. It exceeds the current share price, 
though only by 4.1%, so the upside would be very limited. Furthermore, the maximum 
scenario itself has a very low likelihood of happening, mainly because it requires the 
Online Sales statement to become true already in 2020. In practice, there are roughly six 
months left in the year, and so it seems entirely implausible that before 2021, the related 
legal frameworks would be implemented in the countries where Olvi operates in. How-
ever, this might be different if the TIA probability judgments were not simplified to a 
constant value in this project. Observations like this would ideally lead to a critical re-
examination of the probability judgments of specific TIA statements in later rounds of 
analysis.  
On the opposite end, value investors are especially concerned with the margin of 
safety. The minimum scenario itself has a very low simulated frequency (0.05% of all), 
and similarly to the maximum, may be considered implausible because of what should 
take place still within the year 2020. However, it can more important to think about the 
Q1 at 26.58€ - its valuation is 20.9% below the base/median scenario. Although there are 
no TIA statements included in this analysis that have a chance of completely ruining the 
Olvi business, it is the Healthy Lifestyles & Excise Tax statements that ultimately skew 
the overall expected value down. This can be perhaps be traced back all the way to the 
overall negative connotation of the phenomena originally mentioned by the participants. 
More than anything, the result highlights that a different initial list of phenomena would 
have of course led to different TIA statements, and consequently a different range of val-
uation. The PMT scenarios here are not in any way neutral or balanced. They create a 
range of valuation that is somewhat tilted towards the downside. 
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As also visualized in Figure 11, the importance of the long-term future after the fore-
cast period is pronounced in every scenario, because terminal value forms more than half 
of present value in them all – a common occurrence with this approach (Hitchner 2017, 
146). In the maximum scenario, the terminal period forms up to 78.5% of total present 
value. As the terminal growth rate g is calculated using a CAGR for each of the main 
scenarios individually, it must be highlighted that valuation range between scenarios 
would be reduced if the assumption for g was instead a constant figure. 
Comparing this to the long-term GDP growth rate, the historical average growth rate 
of Finnish GDP is 2.82%, from 1961 to 2019, taken as a measure from data by the World 
Bank and OECD (World Bank 2020). While most scenarios seem to pass this quick test 
of plausibility by having a lower growth rate, the maximum scenario is ringing a warning 
bell with a growth rate of 3.03%. Recalculating the maximum scenario in equation (3) 
but with g lowered back to 2.82% would lower the resulting valuation from 43.23€ to 
40.50€. Although it could be argued that Finnish GDP is not the best possible comparison, 
as Olvi’s income does come from several countries, and Finland’s historical GDP growth 
rate is below the global average rate of 3.48% over the same period, calculated from the 
same source (ibid). Still, the terminal growth rate in the maximum scenario may border 
on the upper limits of what is plausible. 
According to the TIA results, the TIA statements themselves most likely do not ac-
tually have an effect on the median/base scenario. But the underlying assessments of 
probability and impact of the three TIA statements have been accounted for, and Figure 
11 does show their perceived effects, in a way that a single valuation figure does not. 
Different statements about the futures lead to different estimations of present value. There 
could be benefits in thinking about valuation as an explicit range, and the result shows 
that TIA could act as one tool to achieve that outcome – even if the application is not 
necessarily perfect here. 
5.7.1 Comparison rates 
The participants’ annual return expectation of 5.52% is based on subjective opinions, and 
the thought process behind their judgment remains obscured, but this rate is still arguably 
more suitable for the valuation here than either of the two comparison rates are. The cal-
culated CAPM of 3.00% in equation (7) requires too little from the investment, while the 
historical Finnish total return on equities of 10.03% (Jordà et al. 2019, 22) requires too 
much from it. 
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Applying the 3.00% CAPM rate here would utterly break the DDM, leading to a 
completely absurd, overinflated terminal value: the mean scenario would have a per share 
valuation of 199.03€. In other words, Olvi should be worth 4.1 bn €, which would place 
it among the highest valued decile of publicly listed companies in Finland – and that is 
just the value of the dividends! This implausibility is caused by the assumed terminal 
growth rate 2.49% being too close to the 3.00% figure. As discussed, the low CAPM is 
mostly a consequence of the exceptionally low 5-year beta measure of the stock. This 
seems to be an example of how the CAPM does not necessarily always lead to useful 
results in practice with all valuation models. 
Conversely, using the historical Finnish stock market total return is not at all “fair” 
when valuing Olvi only on the basis of its dividends. The mean scenario would be valued 
at just 13.49€. It is reasonable to state that between these three discount rates, the partic-
ipants’ return expectation 5.52% is actually the most realistic and applicable. 
5.7.2 Difference to share price 
Judging by the current share price of 41.50€ as of 30 July 2020, the market is valuing 
Olvi with different criteria than the ones used here. The share price is about 26.9% above 
the mean scenario, which expresses a major difference of “opinion” for what Olvi is 
worth. There are at least three obvious explanations for this. 
The first, most obvious explanation, is that DDMs may be inherently too conserva-
tive, even outdated. While the DDM seems theoretically sound, investors are often willing 
to pay for more than only extrapolated dividends, and at some point, valuation models 
should account for that. A FCFE model would lead to a substantially higher valuation. 
The mean valuation of 32.70€ might be a fair price for future dividends, but maybe does 
not capture the full value of the company. 
The second explanation is that Gordon’s (2009a) logic of extrapolating past data to 
create the base scenario may not necessarily be the best possible practice to define the 
base scenario. In this case, it might be too conservative. As it is the base scenario that the 
10,000 PMT scenarios are built on, if the base scenario is too low, it imposes a constrain-
ing effect on the whole simulation. The weight of this fact is especially emphasized in 
this case, because experts do not judge the TIA statements as probable and impactful 
enough to affect the median scenario. The market is potentially assigning much more 
aggressive growth rates for Olvi than what is implied by the extrapolation. Actors in the 
stock market, even if they are doing some similar type of trend extrapolation of financial 
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data, might be looking at a different (shorter, more recent) historical time period than the 
18 years used as the basis of extrapolation here. A higher share price implies higher as-
sumptions about future growth (Hitchner 2017, 294). In line with Graham & Dodd (1951, 
69), Olvi may be like one of those common situations where the future prospects of the 
business look obviously “rosy” to all market participants, which is consequently reflected 
in the stock price.  
On the other hand, low growth in the base scenario could be justified. By observing 
the historical revenue growth data in Appendix 3, it is not necessarily irrational to think 
that Olvi’s rate of growth may be slowing down. For example, a simple arithmetic average 
of annual revenue growth over the full period is an impressive 8.2%. But in the past ten 
measurement periods (’09-’19), that same average rate has declined to 5.4%, and only at 
three occasions reached the heights of its longer-term average. With the available data, it 
seems possible that the greatest growth years of Olvi could be well behind; the business 
could be maturing. Yet if one only looks at a shorter piece of historical revenue, the nar-
rative changes. Over the three past years, the same average figure is 8.4%, but that is 
greatly elevated by a single exceptional period (’17-’18) with 11.3% growth. It could be 
misleading to use only the recent past as a basis of extrapolation, and theoretically a 
longer sample period might be better. However, this example is not to state that higher 
growth assumptions are necessarily irresponsible, either. The point is merely that other 
actors on the stock market are likely to be assuming more than the quite cautious extrap-
olation in the TIA base scenario. 
A third explanation for the difference to the share price has to do with the discount 
rate used, the most sensitive variable in any DCF. Different market participants are using 
different rates and valuation models. There is no “silver bullet” to find what discount rate 
the market as an aggregate is using (Pratt & Grabowski 2014, 90). A rough way to “re-
verse-engineer” this is to perform simple algebraic manipulation on the DDM equation 
(3) used. By assuming that the market price 41.50€ is correct and inputs for the mean 
scenario are correct, and solving for discount rate k in equation (3), the result is 4.86%, 
which is 0.66 percentage points lower than the participants’ expectation of 5.52%. In this 
case, that 0.66 p.p. would be enough to cause a swing of 26.9% in the present value. This 
simple sensitivity analysis highlights how critical the discount rate truly is. Had the par-
ticipants’ responded with just a slightly lower average return expectation, the valuation 
of all scenarios would be instantly elevated closer to the share price. 
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Finally, it should be noted that the market is not necessarily always “right” – the 
stock price can actually be slightly inflated. Another way to approach valuation is to con-
sider multiples, like the mentioned price-to-book ratio, an integral part of some definitions 
of “value investing”. A price-to-book ratio of 1 would mean that the market price of the 
shares matches the value of equity on the balance sheet. According to Morningstar 
(2020c), Olvi’s price-to-book ratio is 3.45, which is a 18.5% premium to its five-year 
average value of 2.91. Also, looking at just the 52-week history of the share price by 
itself, Olvi has traded at a low of 30.25€ in that time (Morningstar 2020a), lower than the 
mean or median scenarios. In other words, 222.7 M € has flown in and out of the market 
capitalization between that recent low and the current price. Yet it seems completely im-
plausible that the true intrinsic value of the company has really fluctuated by 37.1% in 
less than a year, especially keeping in mind that Olvi operates in a stable, secular industry, 
characterized by a slow rate of change. If the theory of intrinsic value is accepted, then 
either the current price 41.50€ or that recent price of 30.25€ must be closer to the intrinsic 
value than the other, by definition. At a price of 30.25€, the stock could have been con-
sidered slightly undervalued in the mean and median scenarios in Figure 11, and might 
even have potentially represented an attractive buying opportunity. It is also well possible 
that the price may revert back to that level in the future. 
In light of the three major explanations discussed above, it is believable that the mean 
scenario valuation of 32.70€ can be too low. This is especially due to the conservative 
nature of DDM, and the fact that the TIA base scenario also happens to lead to a low 
growth assumption towards 2030. But it is also possible that the share price may be 
slightly too expensive at the moment. The two things could be true at the same time. 
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6 CONCLUSION 
6.1 Overview 
This concluding section answers the research questions. Also, some limitations are re-
flected upon and the potential value of the results to the participants is discussed. It is 
suggested what kinds of parties might be potential users of TIA with DCFs. Finally, some 
obvious further areas of research are discussed. 
The major repeating theme throughout this thesis has been that of subjectivity, in 
relation to both TIA and all types of DCFs. These models create internally consistent 
outputs that have a surface-level appearance of being very “precise” about the futures, 
but the real challenge remains in defining high quality inputs. Continuous self-reflection 
and questioning of assumptions about the futures is necessary for the successful applica-
tion of TIA and DCFs, and this journey can be more important than the destination, the 
final model output. It can be argued that stock valuation, like futures studies, is more art 
than science. 
Although the empirical application of methods was imperfect and suffers from real 
limitations, the main objective of the thesis has been achieved; it has been demonstrated 
that TIA could be combined with a simple DDM. This may extend to DCFs, though more 
research is needed. 
6.2 Answers to research questions 
Research question 1 was written as: “In futures studies literature, has trend impact analy-
sis ever been used in any applications with discounted cash flow methods or similar val-
uation methods?” Based on the literature review, the answer is no. Therefore, the use of 
TIA with a DDM in this project is novel. 
Research question 2 was: “In finance literature, what are the main scenario methods 
that are used in combination with discounted cash flow analyses, and how are those meth-
ods different from trend impact analysis?” Different categories of scenario approaches to 
DCFs were identified from Damodaran (2018). The scenario methods range from very 
simple to complex. Of those, TIA is most similar to simulation approaches, by sharing 
the use of Monte Carlo simulations with them. However, TIA is distinctive especially 
because its source of uncertainty comes from a list of statements about specific future 
phenomena, where probabilities and impacts are defined subjectively. 
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Research question 3: “What kinds of possible future phenomena does a small group 
of Finnish retail investors consider most impactful for Olvi Oyj’s net profit towards 
2030?” To summarize the subjective feedback of the participants to survey 1, they had an 
overall consumer-focused perspective, thinking almost exclusively about the end prod-
ucts that Olvi sells, and factors that might affect their demand. Notably, the excise taxa-
tion of alcohol is a key uncertainty that is considered highly significant by not only the 
participants, but the company itself as well. The participants also discussed the upcoming 
decade more in terms of threats or risks than opportunities. 
Research question 4: “What range of valuation is found for Olvi Oyj through a trend 
impact analysis combined with a dividend discount model?” Following the TIA process, 
and discounting with the participants’ hurdle rate of 5.52%, the mean scenario at 32.70€ 
per share may be understood as the expected value. It is very close to the unmodified base 
scenario and median scenario at 33.64€, reflecting that the TIA statements do not change 
the valuation by much. The interquartile range is from 26.58€ to 36.81€, which illustrates 
how experts judged future phenomena as more harmful than beneficial, on aggregate. The 
extremely unlikely farthest ends of the valuation range are the minimum at 21.28€ and 
the maximum at 43.23€. It is acknowledged that the overall valuation may be too low, 
especially for two reasons: the previously known conservative nature of the DDM, and 
the fact that the base scenario extrapolation assumes a slowing down of growth for Olvi. 
6.3 Limitations 
Here, some main limitations are identified after the analysis of results. It should be noted 
that specific limitations inherent to the methods were already discussed in section 3, and 
practical limitations that were obvious at the stages of research design and the analysis of 
results were discussed throughout sections 4 and 5. 
Due to the case nature of the project, there is little external validity to the results. 
Every piece of empirical data collected (and simulated) is only particular to the valuation 
of Olvi in these specific circumstances, and at a specific point in time. However, what is 
applicable to other contexts is the overall principle of how the TIA and DDM methods 
may be combined, even though clearly some modifications could be beneficial. 
There was no hypothesis testing in this thesis, but internal validity here might ulti-
mately mean whether the simulated valuations measure the intrinsic value of Olvi under 
the subjective inputs sourced from the experts. Theoretically, intrinsic value cannot be 
measured with certainty. It is also one of the main limitations of futures studies that the 
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accuracy of research projects can really only be evaluated after years have passed (Masini 
1993, 53). However, it was recognized that aspects of the valuation were quite likely too 
conservative. It can be stated that the median scenario valuation is not too high. 
Specifically, it needs to be acknowledged that the forecast period of ten years may 
have an overall negative effect on internal validity. Selecting a shorter period might be 
preferable. The TIA base scenario, entirely based on extrapolating historical data, could 
be more valid if the forecast period was less than ten years, simply due to the general 
doubtfulness of extrapolating that far ahead using historical data. For example, a horizon 
in the range of five, or four years, as implied by Little (1962), may have more empirical 
backing. Shortening the forecast period would definitely also have had an influence on 
the TIA expert judgments, perhaps for the better. It can be that ten years is already well 
beyond the limits of the capabilities of even the most knowledgeable experts, when it 
comes to making judgments about complex systems (Tetlock & Gardner 2015, 156), 
which is something that Gordon’s (2009a) writings on TIA do not necessarily 
acknowledge. On the other hand, if a shorter period was used, it would further increase 
the already relatively large portion of terminal value in the DDM. 
If this project would be redone, the question of the depth vs. width of expert judg-
ments should be seriously reconsidered. Surveys 1 and 2 were consciously designed to 
maximize the response rate. Yet as it is, the sample size of all responses is too small to 
have confidence in any statistical significance, or to seriously entertain a “wisdom of 
crowds” or “vox populi” argument (Mauboussin 2007, 201) about the predictive power 
of these judgments. Therefore, if it had been recognized from the beginning that there 
was not going to be a significant number of responses, and that this project would be a 
compromise in that regard, it might have been preferable to focus on greater depth instead. 
Gordon’s (2009a) writing on TIA does not explicitly address how many persons are op-
timal to constitute the experts, but given that the method is an expression of the subjective 
probabilities of a particular group, only five or even fewer persons may be suitable. 
Notably, a workshop or panel approach would also have enabled interaction between 
experts, but this project did not intentionally include that – again due to the focus on width 
over depth. Dialogue and communication between stakeholders may be one of the key 
benefits of TIA (Gordon 2009a, 7), and it is not observed here. 
The project did not attempt to study how participants psychologically manage the 
task of making their judgments about the future. As it is, their judgment processes remain 
a “black box”. The range of answers to each question was very wide, underlining the 
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personal and subjective nature of the judgment process. For example, some answers may 
have involved more calculative reasoning, or others may have been based on pure intui-
tion, but this cannot be deduced from the results. It is also impossible to do more work 
with the same participants, for the simple reason that they are anonymous. Any follow-
up activity was purposefully excluded from this project, but TIA might be best utilized as 
an ongoing process where expert judgments could be revised on an ongoing basis.  
6.4 Value of results to participants 
Since the survey participants are the main stakeholders of the thesis, it is worth discussing 
if they can gain anything from it. It needs to be re-emphasized here that this project is not 
any kind of recommendation for the participants or readers to take any investment actions, 
either based on their participation experience, or on their reading of this document. 
The main message that participants may take away from the 10,000 PMT scenarios 
in Figure 10 and the final valuation result in Figure 11 is that the three TIA statements 
(Healthy Lifestyles, Online Sales and Excise Tax) were ultimately not perceived to be 
critically important for Olvi’s business or the value of the stock. Also, it was judged un-
likely to observe any impacts of these statements before 2024. Therefore, participants 
may want to focus on thinking about other future phenomena instead. Those might have 
less to do with the end products and customers of Olvi, and more with its less visible 
aspects: raw materials, supply chains, production operations etc. 
A secondary benefit to some interested participants can be the opportunity to com-
pare their own return expectation, and judgments of probability and impact, against the 
aggregate judgments. If participants disagree, they might be able to rethink their own 
initial assessment. This can be particularly interesting to those participants who gave out-
lier answers that are far from the average.  
6.5 Potential users of TIA with DCFs 
Parties who might benefit from further experimentation combining TIA with DDMs, and 
by extension, DCFs, are investors who comprehend the inherent experimentality of com-
bining these methods. It must be highlighted that it is not a foregone conclusion that TIA 
is even applicable with all DCFs. Due to the characteristics of TIA, its users should be 
those who do analysis with a fundamental approach. A key condition is that a large 
amount of effort must be spent studying specific phenomena, on a micro-level. Especially 
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the expert judgments can be time consuming to perform. Where the subject is stocks, such 
users could include asset managers, funds, etc., who work with a relatively concentrated 
portfolio (e.g. less than 30 holdings), where every potential investment is analyzed at a 
great level of detail. Outside of the capital markets, TIA with DCFs could be used in 
corporate finance and strategy departments for valuing major investments in long-term 
projects.  
Potential users need to recognize that TIA is not necessarily suitable for all subjects. 
TIA may be best applied on trends that are historically relatively stable and consistent, 
when one wants to evaluate how specified independent future phenomena might swing 
that trend. Since TIA does not truly account for second-order effects, its applicability may 
be limited, perhaps to only investments that do normally generate positive cash flows or 
other economic benefit streams. 
To touch on the ethics of experimenting with probabilistic models in the real world, 
authors like Taleb (2012, 45-46; 336-337) have made calls to restrict such activity out of 
some domains. This idea is well argued by Ben-Haim & Demertzis (2015, 2-3), who state 
that models that deal with Knightian uncertainty (which would include TIA and DCFs) 
should not be relied upon lightly in decision-making, but especially in public policy-mak-
ing, where collective harm can result from the results of poor modeling. To extend that 
argument, for-profit investing might be one of the most ethical areas of life to apply and 
develop experimental scenario methods, because the negative outcomes of any decisions 
made will only affect the individual or organization that made such decisions, and not 
society at large. In smaller-scale private risk-taking, there is less collective harm caused. 
6.6 Further areas of research 
In any further research of TIA with DCFs or other financial contexts, it is advisable to 
take lessons learned from this thesis, especially the limitations, as points to be improved 
upon. The next priority area of research should be those DCF variants that offer a more 
holistic understanding of cash flows, like FCFE and FCFF, to understand if TIA can work 
with them and what adjustments may be necessary. Using free cash flow as the trend 
would potentially lead to much more realistic outcomes than the simplified assumptions 
in this thesis, but the granularity of analytical work will definitely also be higher. Access 
to experts who are intimately familiar with financial analysis is a clear prerequisite to 
trying to combine TIA with FCFE and FCFF methods, for the impact judgments in par-
ticular. The common definition of free cash flow to invested capital is a result of five 
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major accounting items (Hitchner 2017, 128-129), and it may be that impact judgments 
need to be given separately for each of those, adding them up to arrive at free cash flow. 
In impact judgments, absolute figures might be preferable to the relative percentages that 
are typically used in TIA. 
Special areas that require attention in a TIA of free cash flow may arise especially in 
the treatment of scenarios that would lead to negative cash flow or even the failure of the 
business. The traditional form of TIA does not have any built-in “decision-tree” like logic, 
but because the method is malleable, automated guidelines in specific simulation out-
comes could be added. As a simple example, there can be scenarios where a specified 
threshold of free cash flow is not met, which might lead to financial distress or a need to 
raise more capital. Such scenarios could be just automatically stopped at that point in time 
and flagged as “failures”. When making changes to the TIA method, one should note that 
there may be a point where modifications will become impractical or defeat the purpose. 
In all further research, it needs to be remembered that TIAs advantages are that it is a 
simple, easy simulation method. More complex simulation approaches do already exist. 
For additional sources to create the list of TIA statements in an investing context, it 
might be logical to study publicly communicated company management perceptions of 
the future, considering that those persons might be “experts” in the topic. Some possible 
critical management decisions themselves could be the basis for TIA statements. To the 
investor, management behavior can be a source of uncertainty. 
Terminal value on its own is a significant futures related topic. It is naturally relevant 
for futures studies, because it deals with time horizons beyond ten years. A deeper epis-
temological discussion of terminal value, including not only the perpetual growth rate 
approach, but others as well, could be further conducted from a futures studies standpoint. 
As is the case in this thesis, terminal value is easily more important for total valuation 
than what happens in the forecast period, but ironically it is the forecast period may re-
ceive the majority of attention and dedicated analysis. It also should be specifically ex-
amined what assumptions about terminal value would work best in TIA or other scenario 
applications: for example, when using the constant growth rate assumption, it is not clear 
to what degree different scenarios should assume different rates. 
Other than TIAs and DCFs, there is plenty of other methodological and philosophical 
common ground between futures studies and finance that can be researched. For practical 
combinations of methods across disciplines, an actionable idea was mentioned in the lit-
erature review: when futurists create intuitive logics scenarios, like in corporate strategy 
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projects, it can be very appropriate to include even rough valuation estimations under 
each distinct scenario to communicate possible financial outcomes to stakeholders. This 
requires that the focal issue of the intuitive logics scenarios is directly connected to some 
project or asset that could be valued, and as valuation is not commonly an element in 
intuitive logics scenarios, some care is required to find the right balance in how much  
valuation is emphasized. 
More broadly, every investor engages in consciously thinking about and planning for 
the future. The model of the dimensions of futures consciousness by Ahvenharju et al. 
(2018) could be a suitable starting point to a deeper examination of how investors differ 
in their futures thinking. Differences in underlying philosophical stances and views to-
wards the futures between investors can be so drastic that they have led to the existence 
of well recognized styles or strategies, like “value” and “growth” investing. As has been 
highlighted, traditional value investors base their decisions on a clearly articulated cau-
tiousness where “the future is essentially something to be guarded against rather than to 
be profited from” (Graham & Dodd 1951, 42), yet many investors disagree and would 
say the opposite. This thesis has only scratched the surface of possible intersections be-
tween futures studies and finance, and there is much more to be explored. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. Literature review details 
Field Journal title Database used in search 
Accounting Journal of Finance Journal’s website 
& finance Journal of Financial Economics Elsevier 
 
Review of Financial Studies Oxford University Press 
Journal of Accounting Research Wiley 
Journal of Management Wiley 
Journal of Monetary Economics Elsevier 
Journal of Accounting and Economics Elsevier 
Accounting Review JSTOR 
Annual Review of Financial Economics Journal’s website 
Journal of International Economics Journal’s website 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis 
Springer 
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty Springer 
Futures Journal of Futures Studies Journal’s website 
studies Futures Elsevier 
 
Long Range Planning Elsevier 
European Journal of Futures Research Journal’s website 
Foresight Journal’s website 
Technological Forecasting and Social 
Change 
Journal’s website 
 
 
Keywords used 
"DCF" + “scenario” 
"discounted cash flow" + “scenario” 
"discounted cash flow scenario" 
"DCF scenario" 
"cash flow scenario" 
“net present value” + “scenario” 
“npv” + “scenario” 
"trend impact analysis" 
"cross impact analysis" 
"trend-impact analysis" 
"cross-impact analysis" 
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Appendix 2. Disclaimer text in surveys 
YLEISTÄ TIETOA KYSELYSTÄ 
  
Tässä kyselyssä kerätään materiaalia pro gradu -tutkimukseen Turun kauppakorkeakoulussa. Gradu 
julkaistaan syksyllä 2020. 
  
Shareville, Nordnet tai Olvi eivät ole millään tavalla osallisia kyselyyn. 
Osallistuminen on vapaaehtoista. Osallistujat säilyttävät täydellisen yksityisyytensä koko tutkimuksen ajan. 
Vastauksia ei voi yhdistää osallistujen henkilöllisyyteen tai Shareville-profiiliin. 
 
Osallistujiin ei oteta yhteyttä missään tarkoituksessa kyselyn jälkeen. 
  
Kysely ei ole minkäänlainen suositus käydä kauppaa pörssituotteilla. 
  
Kyselyn tekijä ei omista sijoituksia, jotka liittyvät Olviin, eikä tee sellaisia seuraavan kuukauden aikana. 
  
Tämä on voittoa tavoittelematon kokeellinen projekti. 
  
Kyselyn tekijän yhteystiedot: 
Jyri Karhapää 
Turun yliopisto 
[sähköposti-osoite] 
 
Jatkamalla kyselyyn hyväksyt ylläolevan tekstin. 
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Appendix 3. Historical financial data (2002-2019) 
Note: This data is compiled from the 18 annual reports available in Olvi Group (2020b) and provided here 
for convenience. 
The 2002 annual report is not available, but its main financial figures are available in the 2003 report. 
Revenue growth for any year is defined as Revenue in the current year / Revenue of the previous year. 
Net margin for any year is defined as Net profit / Revenue. 
Payout ratio for any year is defined as Dividend paid in the current year / Net profit of the previous year. 
 
 
Historical data. Compiled from Annual Reports (Olvi Group 2020b)  
Year Revenue 
Revenue 
growth 
Net 
profit 
Net 
margin 
Dividend 
paid 
Payout 
ratio 
'02 110,184 N/A 3,957 3.6% 2,175 N/A 
'03 114,554 4.0% 4,159 3.6% 3,021 76.4% 
'04 128,894 12.5% 2,912 2.3% 1,585 38.1% 
'05 147,519 14.4% 9,808 6.7% 3,259 111.9% 
'06 170,319 15.5% 14,824 8.7% 4,411 45.0% 
'07 205,188 20.5% 18,979 9.3% 6,725 45.4% 
'08 222,124 8.3% 12,674 5.7% 8,288 43.7% 
'09 244,165 9.9% 23,009 9.4% 5,411 42.7% 
'10 267,509 9.6% 25,259 9.4% 8,321 36.2% 
'11 285,174 6.6% 12,954 4.5% 10,377 41.1% 
'12 312,230 9.5% 26,164 8.4% 10,377 80.1% 
'13 327,256 4.8% 34,186 10.5% 10,541 40.3% 
'14 328,239 0.3% 33,079 10.0% 13,531 39.6% 
'15 310,494 -5.4% 22,220 7.2% 13,514 40.9% 
'16 321,478 3.5% 32,794 10.2% 14,529 65.4% 
'17 345,185 7.4% 36,124 10.5% 15,574 47.5% 
'18 384,302 11.3% 41,137 10.7% 16,587 45.9% 
'19 408,706 6.4% 42,230 10.3% 18,787 45.7% 
       
Mean  8.2%  7.8%  52.1% 
Median  8.3%  9.0%  44.9% 
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Appendix 4. Form in survey 1 
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Appendix 5. Form in survey 2 
 
 
 
 
Note: The last set of questions was repeated for each TIA Statement. 
To conserve space, those questions are shown here only once. 
Each TIA Statement was displayed at the top of the page that asked questions about it. 
The full TIA Statements are written in English in Table 4. 
 
 
 
(Form continues on next page) 
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Appendix 6. Answers to survey 1 
Return Expectation (%) 
-10 4.9 7 
2.5 5.1 7 
3 5.5 7.7 
3.8 6 9 
4.3 6.1 9.1 
4.3 6.7 18 
4.8 - - 
 
Note: Answers below are presented in their original form, including spelling. 
The “Tone” is categorized either as Negative (Neg.), Positive (Pos.) or unclear (N/A) 
The distinct coding categories are highlighted with different colors. 
 
Most impactful phenomenon Tone Category (Coding) 
Terveysbuumi, ettei olutta tai virvoitusjuomia enää juoda. Neg. Healthy lifestyles 
Vähittäiskaupan muuttuminen verkkoon ja sitä kautta alkoholin 
myynnin lasku 
Neg. Online sales of alcohol 
Vesi on paras janojuoma hype. Neg. Healthy lifestyles 
Suomalaisen kivennäisveden breikkaaminen maailmalla. Pos. Specific product 
Virvoikejuomien käytön vähentyminen esim trendien takia tai 
taloustilanteesta johtuen. 
Neg. Macroeconomy 
Kaljanjuonti menee pois muodista, leimautuu vanhanaikaiseksi/ 
epämuodikkaaksi/ juopoksi 
Neg. Healthy lifestyles 
voi vaikuttaa merkittävästi Olvin nettotulokseen N/A N/A 
Kansalaisille myönnetty helikopteriraha, joka suuntautuu suoraan 
kulutukseen. Muuten vaikea keksiä. 
N/A Monetary policy 
Kulutustottumukset N/A 
Consumption habits 
(Vague) 
joku täysin uusi erilainen tuotekategoria joka saavuttaa suuren 
(maailmanlaajuisen) suosion. 
Aika epätodennäköistä kylläkin. Muuta en keksi. 
N/A 
Radically new product 
category 
Alkoholituotteiden verkkomyynti N/A Online sales of alcohol 
- N/A N/A 
En usko että pyörää keksitään uudestaan   N/A N/A 
Alkoholin kulutuksen nykyistä merkittävämpi väheneminen. 
Muutokset verotuksessa. 
Neg. 
Healthy lifestyles 
Taxation of alcohol 
Ei uusi mutta merkittävin riski on terveellisten ja ekologisten 
elämäntapojen merkittävä lisääntyminen. 
Neg. Healthy lifestyles 
Alkoholiveronkorotukset baltiassa ja Valko-Venäjällä. 
Matkustamisen vähentyminen covid-19 jälkeen, mikä vaikuttaa 
matkustajatuontiin. 
Neg. 
Taxation of alcohol 
Tourism 
COVID-19 
En osaa sanoa. N/A N/A 
Kieltolaki Neg. Prohibition law 
En osaa sanoa N/A N/A 
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Appendix 7. Answers to survey 2 
 TIA statement 
Question 1: Healthy Lifestyles 2: Online Sales 3: Excise Tax 
Probability 
(%) 
10 18 0 
10 20 0 
30 25 5 
31 25 9 
32 25 10 
40 35 12 
44 39 15 
50 42 16 
50 48 18 
60 51 20 
61 60 20 
62 70 23 
75 72 29 
85 75 36 
87 80 ”don’t know” 
Maximum 
impact (%) 
-42 -35 -43 
-38 -3 -38 
-25 10 -30 
-25 13 -30 
-20 17 -28 
-20 20 -25 
-5 25 -20 
-5 30 -13 
-3 37 0 
8 ”don’t know” 5 
10 ”don’t know” 48 
10 ”don’t know” ”don’t know” 
32 ”don’t know” ”don’t know” 
”don’t know” ”don’t know” ”don’t know” 
”don’t know” ”don’t know” ”don’t know” 
Time-to-max. 
impact (y) 
0 1 0 
0 1 0 
1 1 0 
1 1 1 
2 1 1 
2 2 1 
3 2 2 
4 2 3 
4 3 3 
4 3 3 
7 4 4 
7 4 4 
10 5 6 
10 5 ”don’t know” 
”don’t know” 6 ”don’t know” 
Rationale for 
judgments 
En pysty 
vastaamaan,asia riippuu 
mielestäni kehityksen 
vaikutuksesta muiden 
tuotteiden menekkiin ja 
korvaavien tuotteiden 
löytymisestä. 
N/A N/A 
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Appendix 8. Main scenarios summary 
 
Net Profit (M€) & CAGR 
Year Base Min. Q1 Mean Med. Q3 Max. 
’20 41.37 37.12 41.37 41.36 41.37 41.37 43.12 
’21 42.64 34.14 42.64 42.61 42.64 42.64 46.14 
’22 43.90 34.42 43.90 43.88 43.90 43.90 49.14 
’23 45.15 34.69 45.15 45.07 45.15 45.15 50.39 
’24 46.40 35.94 45.42 46.25 46.40 46.40 51.64 
’25 47.66 37.20 45.70 47.44 47.66 48.99 52.90 
’26 48.93 38.47 46.00 48.66 48.93 50.26 54.17 
’27 50.22 39.77 47.29 49.89 50.22 51.55 55.47 
’28 51.54 41.08 47.63 51.15 51.54 52.87 56.78 
’29 52.89 42.43 48.98 52.44 52.89 54.22 58.13 
CAGR 2.49% 1.35% 1.70% 2.40% 2.49% 2.74% 3.03% 
 
 
Note: Simulated dividends are based on the previous years’ net profit. 
Therefore, while the TIA forecast period is 2020-2029, the dividends would practically be paid out in 2021-
2030. 
Dividend per share (DPS) is calculated using equation (4). 
CAGR is calculated using equation (6). 
 
 
Dividend Per Share (DPS) (€) & CAGR 
Year Base Min. Q1 Mean Med. Q3 Max. 
’21 1.00 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.04 
’22 1.03 0.82 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.11 
’23 1.06 0.83 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.19 
’24 1.09 0.84 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.09 1.22 
’25 1.12 0.87 1.10 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.25 
’26 1.15 0.90 1.10 1.14 1.15 1.18 1.28 
’27 1.18 0.93 1.11 1.17 1.18 1.21 1.31 
’28 1.21 0.96 1.14 1.20 1.21 1.24 1.34 
’29 1.24 0.99 1.15 1.23 1.24 1.28 1.37 
’30 1.28 1.02 1.18 1.27 1.28 1.31 1.40 
CAGR 2.49% 1.35% 1.70% 2.40% 2.49% 2.74% 3.03% 
 
